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Abstract 
This dissertation presents research projects which investigated dynamics in the 
perception and appreciation of ambiguous and indeterminate art. It examines how 
semantical instability in art can induce pleasure in the perceiver although defying an 
easy consumption. The idea pursued within this thesis is that insights gained during an 
elaboration of such objects lead to an increase in appreciation (Aesthetic Aha effect, 
Muth & Carbon, 2013)—the creation of meaning itself being rewarding. The comprised 
research projects examine such dynamics in perception and appreciation of visual 
artworks which are semantically instable. A crucial quality of these objects might be that 
they confront the perceiver with semantical instability as well as opportunity for insight: 
for instance, we like Cubist artworks more the better we are able to discern identifiable 
objects in them—still they never dissolve into an easy recognizable interpretation (Muth, 
Pepperell, & Carbon, 2013a). Also the solvability of ambiguity in another set of visual 
artworks did not have positive effects on liking, interest, and affect. Instead, the strength 
of insights gained during their elaboration predicted appreciation positively (Muth, 
Hesslinger, & Carbon, 2015). In line with the Aesthetic Aha effect (Muth & Carbon, 
2013) also the sudden emergence of Gestalt within indeterminate artistic movies elicited 
an increase in liking. Interest—in contrast –already increased prior to these moments of 
insight (Muth, Raab, & Carbon, 2015). The presented findings highlight that art 
perception does not equal a kind of problem solving process in which semantical 
instability needs to be resolved for the artwork to appeal. Instead appreciation might 
benefit from rewarding insights into the instable.  
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“in confused things  
the mind is aroused to new inventions”  
Leonardo Da Vinci (translated by Gamboni, 2002, p. 32) 
General motivation 
This dissertation comprises research projects which investigate dynamics in perception 
and appreciation of ambiguous and indeterminate visual art. Analogous to Leonardo’s 
claim that “confused things” arouse “new inventions” (translated by Gamboni, 2002, p. 
32), it pursues the idea that semantical instability can enable us to gain rewarding 
insights. While this interest has its focus on art perception and appreciation it roots in 
art production: my interest in indeterminacy and ambiguity began in 2009 with a series 
of stop-motion movies manipulating the detectability of more or less vague forms and 
shapes within intuitive drawings (see Figure 1 and the original movies in Supplementary 
material 1). A fascination for the sudden appearance and disappearance of Gestalt 
within a seemingly random entanglement of lines, blots, and scratches made me explore 
the limits and the variety of pattern evocation as well as the rewarding play with the 
induction, manipulation, and deprivation of meaning. The qualities of semantical 
instability on one hand and insight on the other hand motivated the scientific endeavor 
which will be presented within this thesis.  
 
 
Figure 1. Exemplary frames of the stop-motion movie Konstrukte 
by Claudia Muth from the year 2009. 
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The relevance of research on the appeal of semantical instability goes far beyond 
this specific personal interest. The deliberate creation, reception, and appreciation of 
ambiguous phenomena can be traced all along the history of the production and 
reception of cultural artifacts: humans seem to have created ambiguity in images, 
objects, and language since prehistoric times (e.g., Gamboni, 2002). Modernity in art 
certainly is a peak within this development that brought forth artworks entailing various 
forms of—sometimes even unsolvable—contradictions. But also the existence and 
appreciation of riddles, games, and jokes support the assumption that we seek, 
deliberately create, and elaborate cognitive and perceptual challenge and semantical 
instability. Transfers to various fields of interest within psychology, cognitive science, 
sociology, and educational science are obvious: how much incongruity, surprise, and 
ambiguity are needed to induce interest, explorative behavior, and learning processes? 
Is a self-generated insight into challenging material more effective with regard to 
learning than the reproduction of knowledge? And why is it that popular to visit an 
exhibition of artworks that violate perceptual expectancies and habits? 
1. Theoretical part 
1.1 Problem statement 
“The more fluently perceivers can process an object, the more positive their aesthetic 
response” (Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004, p. 364). This main assumption of the 
Hedonic Fluency Model (Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003) describes a 
potential determinant of the frequently reported preference for symmetric, prototypical, 
or familiar objects: the ease of their processing. My artistic experiments made use of a 
quality inherent to so called hidden images (as defined by Gamboni, 2002) which— in 
contrast—are not easy to process as they conceal hardly identifiable objects. And there 
are other ways in which artworks defy an easy processing. A chair-sculpture by Stefan 
Wewerka (Figure 2) for instance interrupts automatic processes of identification by 
disappointing perceptual habits and by destructing the chair’s affordance character (the 
set of possible interactions; see Gibson, 1986). 
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Figure 2. Stefan Wewerka (1969). Untitled; chair-sculpture, 
 corner chair. Munich: Pinakothek der Moderne.  
Photograph by Claudia Muth. 
 
Artworks like these might be comprisable under the programmatic statement of the 
Russian formalist Viktor Shklovsky (1917/2002): 
The technique of art is to make objects 'unfamiliar‘ (...) to increase the difficulty and length of 
perception(...). Art removes objects from the automatism of perception in several ways 
(Shklovsky, 1917/2002, p. 280; referring to artistic language). 
And also the art theorist Konrad Fiedler (1913/1971) pointed out that art is capable to 
defy an automatic conceptual identification while enriching experience. Berlyne (1971) 
described this effect of de- automatization as a “reviving of habituated reactions” (p. 
149) leading to heightened arousal in the perceiver. In other terms: many artworks 
disappoint perceptual and cognitive expectations. In drastic terms: they make us 
experience a breakdown of fluency instead of providing an easy consumption. Are these 
artworks thus less appreciated than objects with determinate meaning which can be 
more easily processed? Do they appeal due to another mechanism or do they affect 
another facet of appreciation than objects which provide ease of processing? The main 
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question underlying this scientific endeavor is consequently how semantical instability 
in art can induce pleasure.  
1.2 Structure and rationale 
The here presented research projects aim to shed light on this question by introducing 
dynamics: instead of matching static responses of participants to static qualities of 
stimuli they investigate perceptual, cognitive, and affective processes involved in the 
elaboration of visual artworks. The idea developed and refined throughout the research 
program is that insights gained during this elaboration lead to an increase in 
appreciation—the creation of meaning being rewarding by itself. From this perspective 
the processing of art is a dynamic, insight-driven elaboration which does not have to 
result in a determinate resolution of semantical instability to induce pleasure in the 
perceiver.  
The following text is structured along an extensive introduction to the 
phenomenon of semantical instability in art and five publications, three of them 
representing the cumulus of the dissertation (each named Core publication hereafter) 
and two of them complementing the cumulus by further publications (each named 
Peripheral publication hereafter). Peripheral publication I (The Aesthetic Aha: On the 
pleasure of having insights into Gestalt; Muth & Carbon, 2013) establishes a mechanism 
which is the basic empirical fundament of the argumentation: the detection of facial 
Gestalts within a two tone image induces an increase in liking. For this Aesthetic Aha 
effect (Muth & Carbon, 2013) to occur, it might be crucial that the object confronts the 
perceiver with a simultaneity of semantical instability and opportunity for insight. 
Accordingly, Core publication I (Give me Gestalt! Preference for Cubist artworks 
revealing high detectability of objects; Muth, Pepperell, & Carbon, 2013a) reveals that 
the ease of the detection of concealed objects within a Cubist artwork predicts its 
appreciation positively—even if the stimulus material is indeterminate and strictly 
speaking unsolvable. Is it thus rather the struggling with semantical instability during 
art perception which is rewarding (as proposed for instance by Ramachandran & 
Hirstein, 1999)? Core publication II (The appeal of challenge in the perception of art: 
how ambiguity, solvability of ambiguity, and the opportunity for insight affect 
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appreciation; Muth, Hesslinger, & Carbon, 2015) allows us to differentiate accordingly 
between the solvability of ambiguity and the strength of insights. It reveals that—
indeed—the strength of our own insights during elaboration but not the solvability of 
ambiguity predicts changes in appreciation positively: the activity of sense-making 
might be rewarding by itself without necessarily resolving semantical instability. It also 
highlights that a multidimensional account of appreciation is crucial, the variable of 
interest being a promising candidate for representing the appeal of challenge in art. 
Peripheral publication II (M5oX: Methoden zur multidimensionalen und dynamischen 
Erfassung des Nutzererlebens; Raab, Muth, & Carbon, 2013) builds the grounds for a 
finer grained picture of the involved dynamics via the so called CEP (Continuous 
Evaluation Procedure) which is applied in Core publication III (The stream of 
experience when watching artistic movies. Dynamic aesthetic effects revealed by the 
Continuous Evaluation Procedure; Muth, Raab, & Carbon, 2015). This final research 
project investigates dynamics in perception and appreciation by making use of the film 
material introduced in the first chapter of this thesis (see Figure 1 and the original 
movies in Supplementary material 1). It extends the previous finding of the Aesthetic 
Aha effect (Muth & Carbon, 2013) by including much higher temporal resolution and a 
multidimensional account of appreciation. Its combination of dynamics and 
multidimensionality allows for the establishment of a preliminary model of the 
relationships between complexity, interest, and liking during the perception of 
indeterminate artistic material—a set of mechanisms which are highly relevant to the 
appeal of semantical instability in art. Each publication is introduced by a short 
description of the according motivation. After providing the original article in its 
original form a critical reflection puts its findings into the thematic context and builds 
connections to the precedent and subsequent publications. A general discussion 
summarizes all findings of the assembled articles, reflects on their relevance for the 
main question of this dissertation, and sketches important limitations of the applied 
approaches and issues to be debated and investigated in the future.  
Before the articles are presented, the next chapters are dedicated to a detailed 
introduction of the phenomena of semantical instability and ambiguity from art 
theoretical, art historical, and psychological viewpoints. This extensiveness proved 
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necessary due to the fuzziness of the involved concepts, their distinctive role in visual 
art, and the variety of according theoretical accounts in psycho-aesthetics.  
1.3 Introduction to semantical instability in art 
1.3.1 Labels and definitions 
Many artworks defy determinacy of meaning by inducing a variety of potential 
meanings. This thesis refers to this general quality via two concepts: semantical 
instability because it comprises a large set of according phenomena and because it is 
evocative of a dynamic quality as well as ambiguity because it is often used in the 
literature as a collective term. This chapter introduces these concepts as well as more 
specific phenomena in detail to arrive at concise definitions referred to throughout this 
thesis. Part of the conceptual challenge hereby lies within the interdisciplinarity of the 
topic. In the art theoretical domain for instance Krieger (2010) subsumed phenomena 
like ambivalence, openness, multistability, mysteriousness, and indeterminacy as well 
as polysemy, homonymy, and vagueness under the concept of ambiguity and provided 
a differentiated analysis of different varieties of ambiguity. A psychological account of 
ambiguity by Zeki (2004) differentiates it fundamentally from phenomena like 
openness and indeterminacy: here, ambiguity describes an instability between 
determinate solutions, several certainties with the same probability (other psychological 
accounts use a wider definition of ambiguity though, see, e.g., Jakesch & Leder, 2009; 
Mamassian, 2008). In Figure 3 for instance you can detect either a vase or two faces; 
both are equally likely but never present at once. While here, the term instability refers 
to several stabilities, potential (Gamboni, 2002) or indeterminate (Pepperell, 2006) 
images promise to contain identifiable patterns but never provide entire determinacy. 
This is for instance the case in Cubist artworks being evocative of recognizable patterns 
but hindering Gestalt recognition: “each hypothesis we assume will be knocked out by a 
contradiction elsewhere” (Gombrich, 1960/2002, p. 240). The differentiation between 
indeterminacy and ambiguity gets difficult to draw if we imagine a continuum between 
determinacy as full stability, bistability as a switch between two stabilities (e.g., Zeki, 
2004), multistability as a switch between several stabilities (e.g., Berlyne, 1971; Kubovy, 
1994), and indeterminacy as an infinite number of potential stabilities.  
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Figure 3. Smithson, J. (2007). Rubin-Vase. Retrieved from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Rubin2.jpg 
 
To furthermore highlight the difficulty of a differentiated conceptualization, we 
can note that the phenomena of indeterminacy and determinacy have a dynamic 
character and both can qualify the perception of a hidden image. Take the movies 
introduced at the beginning of this thesis: out of an indeterminate pattern a 
determinate Gestalt emerges (see Figure 1 and Supplementary material 1). Peripheral 
publication I made use of such hidden images like the one in Figure 4A allowing you to 
find a face within a pattern of black dots. In contrast, Figure 4B shows an indeterminate 
painting which motivates you to search for identifiable bodies without providing 
determinacy. This difference is crucial with regard to the idea pursued within this 
thesis: an insight into the hidden face in Figure 4A is a rewarding Aha experience (see 
Peripheral publication I; Muth & Carbon, 2013). But what if the detected Gestalt is at 
most a fragment as in Figure 4B and for instance in Cubist artworks (see Core 
publication I; Muth, et al., 2013a)? It can be shown that expectation plays a major role 
here: the name of the indeterminate painting Paradox 1 for instance underlines that 
there is incongruity between our expectations to find bodies within the images and the 
actual lack of determinacy. Paradoxes are also present in rather conceptual works; think 
of the famous representation of a pipe by René Magritte in The Treachery of Images 
which he added by the sentence “Ceci n’est pas une pipe” (“this is not a pipe”). Both 
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examples play with incongruence between anticipation and actual stimulus. The variable 
of incongruence was discussed among other so called collative variables by Berlyne 
(1971). These variables describe a collation between object-internal elements or a 
divergence between perceptual cues and expectations. The variable novelty for instance 
describes a collation between elements of here-and-now with elements experienced in 
the past. Still, it is not always an effect of a violated expectation as we can expect novelty 
(Berlyne, 1971). The collative variable of complexity defines the number of collating 
(in)dependent elements. Berlyne (1971) related it to arousal and uncertainty due to the 
growing opportunity for conflict with an increasing number of elements. Conflict exists 
between incompatible simultaneous processes; it applies to novelty, surprise, 
uncertainty, and complexity. Finally, in Berlyne’s (1971) conception ambiguity describes 
a collation of multiple meanings, and instability exists in elements which do not 
conform to a referenced pattern. Collative variables are clearly linked to the phenomena 
described above. Hidden images might induce surprise by a conflict between 
expectation of indeterminacy (random pattern) and sudden perception of determinacy 
(face); even more so as hidden images can be accidental images (Gamboni, 2002) if 
they unintentionally form Gestalt like when we see a lamb in clouds. Also, 
indeterminacy might be linked to the collative variable of complexity due to the high 
number of potential elements and to instability as it does never entirely fit to one 
interpretation or Gestalt alone. Furthermore, Berlyne’s (1971) analysis underlines that 
instability of meaning is about relationships—between elements, between hypotheses, as 
well as between expectations and perceived elements. For our understanding of the 
concept of semantical instability as well as for empirical approaches examining its effect 
on appreciation it is thus crucial to specify the kind of collation of the according material 
and to include the role of expectation. 
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Figures 4. A) Hidden image: We are able to reduce indeterminacy as soon as we detect 
a face in the left display (highlighted in red in the right display). B) Indeterminate or 
potential image: Robert Pepperell’s (2005) Paradox 1 provides cues for potential 
detection but never reveals a determinate Gestalt. 
 
Several open questions regarding the definition of ambiguous phenomena 
become obvious if we look at a concrete example: the neurobiologist Semir Zeki (2004) 
applied his definition of ambiguity as switch between equally probable interpretations 
not only to bistable figures but also to artworks, e.g., to the facial expression of the girl 
depicted in Vermeer’s The Pearl Earring from the year 1665. The rationale is that—
analogous to the detection of vase versus face in Figure 3—her facial expression offers 
different interpretations: “at once inviting, yet distant, erotically charged but chaste, 
resentful and yet pleased” (Zeki, 2004, p. 189). But semantical instabilities like these 
might not actually be reducible to a switch between determinate interpretations. They 
eventually build up new categories integrating the inconsistencies within one object. 
Think for instance of the androgynous fashion style of Berlin women in the 1920s. 
Despite once having been ambiguous with regard to perceptual habits and semantic 
connotation of stylistic elements, it is a rather determinate pattern of style from today’s 
perspective. Again, a differentiation of semantical instability with regard to the actual 
relationships between elements is useful here. We might describe our experience of the 
facial expression in Vermeer’s painting with reference to Berlyne’s (1971) collative 
variables as novel due to a mismatch with patterns of familiar facial expressions and as 
incongruent due to conflicts between elements associated with different partially 
mutually exclusive meanings. Instead of an incongruity—implying simultaneity of 
A B 
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conflicting interpretations—Zeki (2004) proposes an oscillation between 
interpretations. The expression of the face might even be instable in Berlyne’s (1971) 
sense as it does not resemble a typical pattern (it does not provide Prägnanz; see 
Berlyne, 1971). Another insightful account of how conflicting elements and 
interpretations can relate to each other in ambiguity is provided by Kaplan and Kris 
(1948; with regard to linguistic ambiguity). They speak of projective ambiguity when 
meaning differs across perceivers, disjunctive ambiguity when mutually exclusive 
interpretations are induced, additive ambiguity when there is overlap between 
interpretations, conjunctive ambiguity when several meanings contribute jointly to an 
interpretation for instance in irony and humor, and integrative ambiguity when several 
meanings are divergent but build one complex meaning together—like it might be the 
case with the girl’s facial expression. Besides these theoretical suggestions, empirical 
approaches to a categorization of ambiguity in art are rare (see, e.g., Muth & Carbon, 
2012) but seem highly important with regard to the fuzziness of the applied concepts as 
well as to the overlap of according phenomena.  
Another challenge for a clear definition of ambiguous phenomena concerns the 
sensitivity to context: Gaver, Beaver, and Benford (2003) gave a theoretical account on 
three types of ambiguity in design. They stated that not only object-based information 
can be ambiguous—also determinate information can become ambiguous in certain 
contexts. So called Ready Mades are industrially produced objects exhibited in an art 
context which make use of this technique by being everyday objects and potentially 
meaningful artworks alike. And as a third option ambiguity “arises from the viewer’s 
personal relationship with the piece” (Gaver et al., 2003, p. 237). Especially the latter 
type of ambiguity seems highly relevant for product design but as well if you think 
about contemporary Relational art (Bourriaud, 1998) which includes participation of 
the audience, for instance by organized Swarm-Happenings evoking discussions on the 
usability of public space. Here, people’s interactions make up the artwork in the first 
place. Pretend play is even another example for the relevance of the relationship 
between object and perceiver as a source of ambiguity. Here, an object changes its 
meaning due to a new way of interaction, a re-enaction of meaning (Di Paolo, Rohde, & 
De Jaegher, 2007)—using a hairbrush as a microphone for instance. As will be described 
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in the next chapter—not unlike play—art makes us of and violates general perceptual 
habits; semantical instability might even be a cultivated feature of art. The perception 
scientist Pascal Mamassian (2008) accordingly described ambiguities in art along with 
conventions how they are perceived, applied, and rooted in general perceptual 
constraints (for instance the way Egyptian art presents human contortions). He 
analyzed conventions with regard to composition, spatial scale, illumination and color, 
three-dimensional layout, shape, and movement. 
To conclude: within this thesis semantical instability and ambiguity will be used 
as comprising terms for various characteristics of objects defying a determinate 
interpretation. More specifically it will be referred to hidden images if objects conceal 
identifiable patterns, multistability if several meaningful patterns can be established 
and indeterminacy or potentiality if objects are evocative of an identifiable pattern but 
never provide determinate identification. The review of the various kinds of semantical 
instability from art historical, art theoretical, and psychological perspectives revealed 
that they differ in the way perceived elements and expectations relate to each other. The 
characteristics of some of these relationships are of great use for the empirical 
investigation of effects of semantical instability in art: a hidden image as the one in 
Figure 4A for instance allows for comparing effects of indeterminacy (random 
elements) on appreciation with those of determinacy (face). Peripheral publication I 
accordingly examined the effect of the sudden detection of a facial Gestalt on liking 
(Muth & Carbon, 2013). Potential pictures—in contrast—provide the opportunity to see 
how an ongoing disappointment of expectations affects the perceiver. This was highly 
relevant to Core publication I which shed light on the appeal of Cubist artworks and to 
Core publication II examining if we can appreciate art even if indeterminacy cannot be 
resolved with elaboration. Core publication III furthermore dealt with the role of 
expectation which—as the current chapter highlighted—is a crucial factor for the 
induction of ambiguity and—as will be shown—plays a great role for the arousal of 
interest as well.  
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1.3.2 Specifics of semantical instability in art 
The question how semantical instability in art can induce pleasure might as well refer to 
the perception of non-easy objects in general: finding Wally in a crowd of similar people 
(a kind of hidden image), or finding out what your child intended to draw (might get 
close to indeterminacy), seeing a new car design for the first time, or being overtaxed by 
a map of New York—why focusing on art perception? Ambiguity is claimed to be a 
characteristic of especially modern art from the perspective of art theory (e.g., Gamboni, 
2002; Krieger, 2010; Shklovsky, 1917/2002) as well as from the perspective of 
perception science (e.g., Jakesch & Leder, 2009; Mamassian, 2008; Van de Cruys & 
Wagemans, 2011; Zeki, 2004). But is there something specific about the semantical 
instability in artworks? As these questions seem highly relevant to the whole endeavor 
of this thesis an overview on three main arguments shall be given within this chapter 
before the text turns to psycho-aesthetic accounts of the appeal of semantical instability 
in art. 
One answer to the question of the specificity of semantical instability in art is 
that semantical instability is a cultivated, historical feature of art. The paradigmatic 
character of ambiguity as a quality characteristic is applicable to art at least since the 
epoch of modernity starting around the beginning of the 19th century (see, e.g., Krieger, 
2010). But “several ways” to a de-automatization of perception—as intended by 
Shklovsky (1917/2002)—were already undertaken before. For instance it is suspected 
that Albrecht Dürer concealed faces in drawings of pillows in 1493 (see Gamboni, 2002). 
And deliberate ambiguous manipulations of picture elements occurred frequently from 
the 16th century on. Back then, art went beyond the religious context which had 
demanded the generation of symbolic motives offering a determinate interpretation (a 
specific saint had to be identifiable as such; see Krieger, 2010). Popular examples from 
this era are Arcimboldo’s visual compositions of vegetables, fruits, and other objects 
which together resemble a human head. It might be useful to look at an analysis of the 
beginning of modernity in art, especially in painting, to understand why modernity and 
semantical instability are often explicitly linked to each other. According to Meinhardt 
(1997) the invention of photography and other techniques of reproduction in the mid-
19th century induced a crisis for painting—a photograph being the ‘better’ depiction. 
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Threatened by its replaceability painting had to explore its possibilities asides the 
mimetic function. Subsequent artistic approaches can be understood as a response to 
that threat; they focused less on the represented sujet but reflected for instance on the 
process of perception itself (e.g., in impressionism) or on the activity of painting (e.g., in 
expressionism; Meinhardt, 1997). According to Meinhardt (1997) painting was shaken 
by another crisis in the beginning of the 20th century induced by Marcel Duchamps’ first 
Ready Mades. The aesthetic experience of an artwork, its status as an artwork as well as 
the supposition of meaningfulness of an artwork were exposed as social conventions 
bound to the context of a gallery or a museum. The subsequent route of self-reflection in 
art and its reflection of its own conventional context can again be understood as a 
response to that second crisis (Meinhardt, 1997). For instance, monochrome paintings 
deprived the image of a representation (the illusory layer) and thus pointed to the 
ambiguity of material and illusory layer of pictures in the first place. Another way to 
make such an ambiguity explicit was taken by Lucio Fontana in the 1950s and 1960s 
who pointed to the materiality of a painting by cutting the canvas. Among the different 
manners of self-reflection art movements like Art Informel aimed at a total deprivation 
of objects from associations and intentionality (Krieger, 2010). Here, semantical 
instability refers to an intentional openness during the production of artworks. 
According to Eco (1989) an open artwork is thus “characterized by the invitation to 
make the work together with the author” and “is effectively open to a virtually unlimited 
range of possible readings” (p. 21). If a total lack of associations is possible though is 
highly questionable from a psychological view promoting strong effects of knowledge on 
perception. Other modern as well as postmodern means to induce semantical 
instability—besides, e.g., the context shift inherent to Ready Mades and intentional 
openness in Art Informel—are for instance contradictions among style and content, 
contradictions by multiple perspectives and techniques like collage, or recourses on 
other artworks (Krieger, 2010).  
A second argument for the specificity of semantical instability in art might come 
from a sociologist perspective: the level of ambiguity might not stem from the artwork’s 
features alone but might be bound to historical changes in reception. Krieger (2010) 
highlights that nowadays ambiguity is widely perceived as an aesthetic norm 
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influencing the judged quality of an artwork; great art has to be challenging and 
semantically instable. Also, beyond its aesthetic impact, ambiguity in art fulfills the 
function of social distinction. This point clarifies that a work of art is a historical artifact 
and an aesthetic object at the same time and thus its reception is different at different 
time points in history (Krieger, 2010).  
Even another answer to the question is that at least mimetic paintings are 
ambiguous per se: they always entail simultaneity of a material layer—canvas and 
color—and an illusory layer—the depicted content (see, e.g., Gombrich, 1960/2002; 
Krieger, 2010). Gregory (1970) even claimed in this regard that “[p]ictures have a 
double reality”; they are paradoxical (p. 32). Importantly, from a psychological 
perspective, this co-existence might not necessarily pose a challenge to the observer who 
is trained in looking at representations—at least unless he or she is pointed to it. That we 
acknowledge the dual nature of a painting being material and image—even if we might 
not be aware of that—is reflected in the point that we do not take the depicted as real; 
illusion here is not delusion. In other words: “[i]f art actually has the power to convince 
us that appearances are reality, perhaps it ought to be outlawed along with 
hallucinogenic drugs” (Burwick, 1990, p. 122). This point furthermore questions the 
exclusivity between the experience of form versus the experience of content: if we focus 
on an artwork’s content we never entirely exclude the fact that we are confronted with a 
representation—this seems also true when singing in a hairbrush. While the question if 
we can be conscious of various interpretations of an object at the same time is only 
peripheral to the here comprised empirical research projects it actually lies at the very 
core of the theoretical conception of ambiguity and semantical instability as well as of 
its appeal. A short excursus to this topic for the sake of completeness might thus be 
beneficial to this thesis:  
From a classical psychological view the principle of exclusivity forbids a 
simultaneity of states or meanings and thus explains sudden switches between 
interpretations in multistable perception (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999). Similarly, in the 
domain of art history and philosophy, Gombrich (1960/2002) argued that we are not 
able to be simultaneously aware of conflicting interpretations of a bistable picture; 
instead “[i]t is through the act of ‘switching’ that we find out that different shapes can be 
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projected into the same outline” (p. 198). Accordingly, we would not be able to regard 
the surface and the represented scene of a painting simultaneously as “we cannot, 
strictly speaking, watch ourselves having an illusion” (p. 5). In contrast, Richard 
Wollheim (1982) developed the concept of seeing-in which would qualify each kind of 
representational perception: our capacity to perceive a depicted scene in the way it is 
represented. This would enable us in the first place to praise a good painting by the way 
it represents an object via brushstroke and color like we are able to fuse phoneme and 
meaning in lyric poetry. On the other hand, as described in Berlyne (1971), visitors of 
exhibitions might step forward and backward oscillating between a focus on the 
represented content versus a focus on the form—e.g., color and composition—of an 
artwork. With regard to pretend play—in which something is represented by something 
else as well—we might ask if we oscillate analogously between microphone and 
hairbrush or if we rather use the microphone as represented in form of the hairbrush (to 
roughly refer to Wollheim’s idea of seeing-in). Furthermore, despite being mutually 
exclusive, we don’t seem to experience a conflict between the two interpretations of the 
object. Berlyne (1971) contributes to the question of simultaneity of elements or 
hypotheses in ambiguity by taking yet another perspective:  
An expectation can be associated with more or less confidence or “subjective 
probability.” It follows from this that expectations of several mutually exclusive events 
can occur in the same individual at once (Berlyne, 1971, p. 144).  
In other words: uncertainty is induced by a deviation of actual perceptual cues from our 
expectations and this signifies that there might be a simultaneity or collation between 
perceptual hypotheses or between hypotheses and actual perceptual cues. Semantical 
instability might thus be marked by such an ongoing mismatch in the case of 
potentiality or indeterminacy. The question of simultaneity in semantical instability is 
quite relevant to our understanding of perception in general; think of the duality with 
which we are confronted every day when perceiving a coin as round while seeing it as 
elliptic from most perspectives (see an overview on an according philosophical 
discussion in Noë, 2012). In the case of art perception it might even be crucial for an 
aesthetic effect that we experience incongruity between the two layers of content and 
form: the psychologist Lew Wygotsky (1976) pointed to the fact that material and 
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content are never independent of each other; the same figure made either of paper or of 
bronze will have a completely different appearance and effect on the perceiver. This 
dependence gets obvious in the poetic induction of contradictions between the form of a 
verse and its content—for instance by utilizing a meter which differs from the natural 
rhythm of the words. The rhythmic distortion between content and form—the way in 
which the words’ content is represented—might affect our appreciation of the poem to a 
great part. The crucial point with regard to the topic of this thesis is that some aesthetic 
effects in art seem to require an according simultaneous dichotomy between content 
and form: a disappointment of familiar perceptual patterns, a breakdown of fluency.  
 This chapter discussed three arguments for the specific link between semantical 
instability and art: first, semantical instability is a cultivated, historical feature of art. 
Second, also the reception and appreciation of ambiguity in art is dynamic and linked to 
conventions; nowadays semantical instability is a normative quality characteristic. 
Third, representational art always entails ambiguity by a conflict between material layer 
and illusory layer. The question if this conflict equals a simultaneous incongruence is 
strongly debated and underlies the theoretical conception of ambiguity as well as the 
examination of its effects on perception in general. 
 With an examination of phenomena and art-specific aspects of semantical 
instability at hand, the next chapter turns to theoretical accounts of psycho-aesthetics 
which are tightly related to the main question of this thesis and the subsequently 
presented research projects. 
 
1.3.3 The appeal of semantical instability 
The psychological examination of art perception is a focus of the research field of 
psycho-aesthetics having itself a large intersection with neuro-aesthetics. A typical 
definition of aesthetic experience in these domains reads like this:  
an aesthetic experience is one that allows the beholder ‘to perceive-feel-sense’ an artwork 
(from the Greek aisthese-aisthanomai), which in turn implies the activation of sensorimotor, 
emotional and cognitive mechanisms (Di Dio & Gallese, 2009, p. 682).  
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This dissertation indeed investigates such processes of perception, affect, and 
appreciation during the perception of visual art. Still, we certainly can imagine aesthetic 
experiences which cover a wider range of situations and encounters than the ones 
including art works—for instance during the observation of nature. Furthermore, we 
might even doubt if every encounter with an artwork necessarily leads to an aesthetic 
experience. And vice versa, aesthetic experience might have more specific facets than 
the activation of perceptual, emotional and cognitive mechanisms in general—which is 
true for many objects. We can differ for instance between effects of beauty and the 
sublime as well as between affective qualities of aesthetic peak experiences—the 
Aesthetic Trinity Theory for instance differentiates between three concepts with regard 
to the quality of experience as well as to the frequency of its appearance (increasing with 
order) “aesthetic awe, being moved or touched, and thrills” (Konečni, 2005, p. 27; see 
also a recent discussion of according empirical data in Konečni, 2015). Psycho-aesthetic 
research and theory provides at least three different theoretical models which are highly 
relevant to the investigation of the appeal of perceptually and cognitively challenging 
visual objects. As it is referred to them repeatedly throughout the reported publications, 
they shall be introduced here in short.  
a) Appeal by fluency of processing 
Easy, familiar, symmetrical, or prototypical objects can be processed more fluently than 
their counterparts and according to the Hedonic Fluency Model (e.g., Winkielman et al., 
2003) such high processing fluency is marked by positive affect (for a review see Reber 
et al., 2004). Fluency can be perceptual—when it “reflects the ease of low-level, data-
driven operations that deal primarily with surface features of the stimulus, or its 
perceptual form” as well as conceptual—referring to “the ease of high-level operations 
concerned primarily with categorization and processing of a stimulus' relation to 
semantic knowledge structures” (Winkielman et al., 2003, pp. 199-200). The Fluency 
Attribution Model (Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992) furthermore states that their positive 
effect is then misattributed to the object itself: a prototypical object might for instance 
be liked more than a non-prototypical one because of its fluent processing characteristic. 
Evidence for the relationship between familiarity and liking is provided, e.g., by the 
mere exposure effect (originally reported by Zajonc, 1968). Here, liking increases with 
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the number of unreinforced presentations of a stimulus—and thus supposedly by an 
increase in fluency of processing via familiarity. With regard to the main question of this 
thesis how non-easy stimuli might appeal, it is thinkable that in some cases conceptual 
fluency (e.g., an interpretation) is high although perceptual fluency (e.g., with regard to 
processing of contrast or complexity) is low. For instance,  
[c]omplexity may sometimes be preferred because it facilitates access to the meaning of 
the stimulus. That is, a decrease in perceptual fluency due to complexity may be 
outweighed by an increase in conceptual fluency due to meaningfulness (Reber et al., 
2004, pp. 373-374).  
Also, the appeal of ambiguity might be explainable by positive effects of fluency via 
expectation as “when processing is expected to be difficult, yet turns out to be easy, it 
creates a particularly strong experience of aesthetic pleasure” (Reber et al., 2004, p. 
373). After all, aesthetic pleasure certainly is multifaceted (see Faerber, Leder, Gerger, & 
Carbon, 2010, for an overview on multiple variables of aesthetic appreciation). Thus, 
low fluency might affect liking in a different way as it affects, e.g., interest. Importantly, 
the Hedonic Fluency Model (Winkielman et al., 2003) was recently discussed with 
regard to the role of valence: do we actually prefer an object—be it of negative or of 
positive valence—if it can be more easily processed than its counterparts? Or does 
fluency rather amplify the evaluation in the according direction with objects of negative 
valence being actually disliked more the more fluent they are processed (see Fluency 
Amplification Model by Albrecht & Carbon, 2014)? 
b) Appeal by moderate increases of arousal potential or decreases of high arousal 
Familiarity does not always result in increases of liking but is limited by boredom 
instead (Bornstein, 1989). The integration of a positive effect of familiarity and a 
negative effect of boredom can be achieved by interpreting both as influences on 
arousal: Berlyne (1971) proposed that one of two neural reward systems reacts to a 
moderate rise of “arousal potential or, if one prefers, the psychological strength (...) of 
stimulation” (p. 91). Such a pleasure can be induced for instance by a moderate value 
with regard to collative stimulus properties (like complexity, instability, novelty, etc.; 
see chapter 1.3.1). One crucial point hereby is that while arousal might rise with the 
“degree of change, rate of change, and range of variability” of hypotheses induced by a 
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pattern (Berlyne, 1971, p. 141), not every kind of semantical instability inevitably leads 
to an irritation in the perceiver. We live quite well with contradictory mental models: we 
know that the earth turns around the sun but state at times that the sun “rises” and we 
accept that a photograph is an illusory image on the one hand and paper and color on 
the other hand. Still, Jakesch and Leder (2009) found indeed that moderately 
ambiguous stimuli are preferred over those of low and high ambiguity. Ambiguity was 
defined here as incompatibility between an artwork and additional auditory statements. 
This idea implies that if we encounter an easy, for instance familiar, object arousal 
might be too low to appeal; if we encounter a difficult or novel object arousal might be 
too high to appeal (for a study which—in contrast—points to positive links between 
novelty and activation of the reward system see Wittmann, Bunzeck, Dolan, & Düzel, 
2007). Berlyne (1971) suggests that the reluctance to highly arousing stimuli might stem 
from the link to dangerous—highly arousing—situations which we should react to with 
aversion. On the other hand, we might seek novelty and with it high arousal as it 
motivates exploration and enables us to learn something after all (e.g., Hekkert, 2006). 
But also from Berlyne’s (1971) perspective, difficult objects can allow pleasure via a 
secondary reward system which inhibits the aversive system and thus “produces reward 
when arousal is lowered after rising to an uncomfortably high level” (Berlyne, 1971, p. 
85). This mechanism might be effective for instance if we decrease the difficulty of a 
new—highly arousing—stimulus by increasing its familiarity via the number of 
presentations (see mere exposure effect, Zajonc, 1968). Here, it’s the reduction of 
arousal potential which leads to appreciation (for an overview on studies which—in 
contrast—link high arousal with pleasure see Silvia, 2006). If such a familiarization with 
the object goes on for too long, arousal becomes too low and boredom sets in. With 
regard to the focus of this thesis, it is relevant that simple stimuli lead to boredom more 
quickly than difficult ones:  
The role of boredom as a limiting condition on the exposure effect is supported by the 
finding that stimulus complexity seems to enhance affect ratings. Presumably, simple stimuli 
become boring more quickly than complex stimuli, resulting in a more rapid downturn in 
the frequency-affect curve (Bornstein, 1989, p. 279).  
A combination of both processes—an increase in arousal together with its decrease—
might induce pleasure, as can be exemplified in non-art domains as well:  
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There are plenty of examples connected with mild hunger and subsequent eating, sexual 
activity, or simply the anticipation and consummation of unwrapping a birthday present. 
Aesthetic patterns may likewise give pleasure through both arousal increase and closely 
following arousal reduction (Berlyne, 1971, p. 92). 
Furthermore, we can imagine objects which are new and typical at the same time—in 
other words Most Advanced, Yet Acceptable (MAYA, a principle set up by the designer 
Raymond Loewy and tested in psychological studies by Hekkert, 2006). This fruitful 
combination inspired Hekkert (2006) to the claim that instead of an exclusive 
preference for either novelty or typicality “[w]e tend to prefer products with an optimal 
combination of both aspects“ (p. 167). With regard to the main question of this thesis it 
can thus be assumed that there are suitable, namely moderate, degrees at which 
ambiguity appeals most. As will be reported later-on, Core publication II examined this 
hypothesis in reference to ambiguous artworks. 
 
c) Appeal by reduction of uncertainty 
The idea of predictive coding states that perception is not a passive reception of 
information but guided by expectations and knowledge. It is based on the concept of 
perception as inference by Von Helmholtz (1866; and discussed recently in Clark, 2013). 
It states that we constantly make predictions, form hypotheses about the world, and 
match them to current sensory inputs. If there is no consistency between these 
predictions and actual cues provided by perception our expectations are disappointed. 
Such a prediction error is for instance marked by being surprised, uncertain or irritated. 
To induce surprise in their participants, Ludden, Schifferstein, and Hekkert (2012) 
presented objects which looked very similar but differed in tactual characteristics. The 
level of surprise can be defined here by the level of visual-tactile incongruity: if the 
hypothesis based on visual cues (e.g., “this looks soft”) is disappointed (e.g., “this feels 
hard”), people are surprised. Prediction errors can occur either by such a mismatch 
between perception and expectation (surprise) or by unusual or contradictory collation 
of elements (incongruity). This differentiation between a conflict by succession or by 
simultaneity is hard though because the perception of incongruities involves dynamics, 
too:  
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Elements that are present at the same time are likely to be examined in turn, so that 
when we are, for example, looking at a large complex painting, what we see in one area 
arouses expectations that cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed until our eyes move to 
focus on another area (Berlyne, 1971, p. 145).  
Furthermore, Berlyne (1971) suggests three ways in which artists manipulate the 
beholders’ expectations: by violation of expectations (see also Van de Cruys & 
Wagemans, 2011), by inducing contradictory hypotheses, and by providing no cues at all 
to form hypotheses in the first place (it is unclear though if it is possible at all not to not 
provide any cues by which hypotheses can be formed). In the rationale of predictive 
coding, such prediction errors would lead to negative affect as the predictions prove to 
be wrong (Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011). Also, in case of high discrepancy between 
elements or hypotheses “emotional disturbance, exploratory behavior, and thinking” as 
well as an orienting reaction would set in along with heightened arousal (Berlyne, 1971, 
p. 144). If our predictions are—in contrast—of high accuracy, they are thought to be 
reinforced by positive affect. This idea can be related back to the Hedonic Fluency 
Model (Winkielman et al., 2003) stating that high processing fluency induces positive 
affect: easy objects provide more (or more determinate) cues for and thus a high 
accuracy of predictions. On the other hand, it might be relevant that the object provides 
opportunity for novel predictions. Accordingly, the limitation of the mere exposure 
effect by boredom, as reported above, was transferred to predictive coding by 
Chetverikov (2013) stating that “when we are forced to continue our interaction with an 
object but cannot make any novel and correct predictions about it, we will begin to 
dislike it” (p. 387). 
What does the framework of predictive coding tell us about the appeal of visual, 
semantically instable artworks? Like for all kinds of prediction errors the encounter 
with these artworks might at first result in negative affect because “they signal that there 
is something wrong with the mental model we use to generate the predictions” (Van de 
Cruys & Wagemans, 2011, p. 1038). In succession, our perceptual system would try to 
reduce prediction errors to increase the accuracy of our hypotheses by refining them. 
According to the tentative prediction error account of visual art (Van de Cruys & 
Wagemans, 2011) such a process of decreasing uncertainty increases positive affect 
again. Accordingly, it was found that appreciation of innovative objects—which are 
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initially disliked because they don’t match common visual habits—benefits from intense 
elaboration (Carbon & Leder, 2005). Also challenging artworks might repel us at first 
but a subsequent active elaboration might increase appreciation again. Following a 
crucial point made by Van de Cruys and Wagemans (2011) pleasure might actually be 
even greater if a prediction error precedes uncertainty reduction than without an 
encounter of incongruence in the first place. Similarly, Dörner and Vehrs (1975) showed 
that patterns are most appreciated if the perceiver experiences difficulties in finding 
order in them at first, but succeeds in the end. Such a contrast effect on appreciation 
(being repelled at first by the challenge and rewarded then by its solution) is compatible 
with Berlyne’s (1971) idea that a combination of an increase in arousal with a 
subsequent reduction of arousal is effective on the reward system as well as with Van de 
Cruys and Wagemans’ (2011) idea of reward by reduction of uncertainty.  
The introduction to the phenomenal variety of semantical instability as well as 
the psycho-aesthetic accounts of its appeal clarify: to explain the appeal of semantical 
instability in art we have to focus on the relationship between artwork and observer and 
we have to include temporal and semantical dynamics of perception and appreciation in 
our conception. Instead of applying a static model relating the appeal of an object with 
its instability of meaning (see Figure 5A) we have to reveal how semantical instability 
and appreciation evolve with elaboration. Figure 5B visualizes one exemplary and 
idealized model of such a relationship. The main question of this thesis—how 
semantical instability in art can induce pleasure—is strongly bound to exactly these 
dynamics. The first publication presented in the next chapter will accordingly examine 
how sudden increases in stability, Aha moments, affect the appreciation of hidden 
images.  
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Figures 5. Models of a static (A) and a dynamic (B) account of semantical instability 
and appreciation. The sketched pattern of changes in B represents a mechanism by 
which appreciation is negatively linked to semantical instability: an increase in stability 
leading to an increase in appreciation. Note that the curve would look different for 
multistable images as in these cases semantical instability is one between stabilities 
over time and thus would create at most a short and sharp-edged interruption of an 
otherwise constant low value for semantical instability. 
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2. Empirical part 
2.1 Peripheral publication I. The Aesthetic Aha: On the pleasure of having 
insights into Gestalt  
Motivation 
The introduction to the phenomenon of semantical instability in art and on theories 
explaining its appeal revealed that the key to determine relevant factors is to include 
dynamics within the examination of its perception and appreciation (see Figure 5B). 
Hereby, one relevant mechanism might be the gain of reward by a decrease in 
uncertainty, especially if the material is challenging (e.g., Dörner & Vehrs, 1975; Van de 
Cruys & Wagemans, 2011; see previous chapter). With regard to the main question of 
this thesis it can thus be hypothesized that appreciation of semantical instability in art 
benefits from a decrease in uncertainty during its elaboration. A further idea which 
considers the dynamics of perception and appreciation of semantical instability states 
that the struggle to find meaning within artworks might itself be pleasurable 
(Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999). Within the research project discussed in this chapter 
our idea was to integrate both accounts by suggesting that we do not need a linearly 
progressive reduction of uncertainty to gain pleasure from ambiguous objects but that 
insights gained during their elaboration are pleasurable. The creation of meaning itself 
might be rewarding because the sudden decrease of uncertainty by such an Aha insight 
leads to a temporal increase in positive affect—an effect which we labelled as Aesthetic 
Aha. Instead of a progressive increase in certainty, such Aha moments might happen at 
several times during processing and sometimes even without a final resolution of 
semantical instability. This idea allows for comprising phenomena which are strictly 
speaking “unsolvable” with regard to determinacy of meaning—like the ones exemplified 
by the artworks in Figures 2 and 4B. The aim of this study was consequently to arrive at 
a third model complementing those depicted in Figures 6A and 6B. Figure 6C clarifies 
how it differs from the others with regard to the described pattern of changes (insights 
are marked by “!”). 
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Figures 6. Models of a static (A) and two dynamic accounts of semantical instability 
and appreciation (B, C). In model B the pattern of changes represents a mechanism by 
which appreciation is negatively linked to semantical instability. Model C considers the 
positive effect of one or several Aesthetic Ahas (!) on appreciation. 
 
To provide initial empirical support for this idea an investigation of the effect of 
the sudden recognition of Gestalt on appreciation seemed suitable. Drawing on the 
previous theoretical analysis of different kinds of semantical instability such an Aha 
insight (a sudden and easy solution with high confidence, see e.g., Bowden, Jung-
Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Topolinski & Reber, 2010) can be best achieved 
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during the perception of hidden images as they entail the characteristic phases of initial 
indeterminacy (seemingly random pattern) and subsequent determinacy (detectable 
hidden figure). Consequently, Peripheral publication I used non-art hidden images 
concealing facial structures within patterns of black and white organic shapes and dots 
(as in Figure 4A).  
Besides the choice of the stimulus material, it was a methodological challenge to 
test the hypothesis of reward by insight. This concerned on one hand the detailed 
assessment of dynamics of perception and appreciation. With the Repeated Evaluation 
Technique (RET) Carbon and Leder (2005) introduced a study design which comprises 
two time points of evaluation—one before and one after an elaboration phase—to 
investigate the influence of elaboration on appreciation. An extension of the RET 
(Carbon & Leder, 2005) by additional repetitions of test phases allowed us to capture 
the relevant dynamics in perception and appreciation of a hidden image in a more fine-
grained way. Another challenge for the design of this study was that a sudden detection 
of Gestalt changes the target of evaluation: when asked to evaluate the level of 
appreciation of such a picture without further explication, participants might at first 
judge the composition of the indeterminate pattern (e.g., on harmony) whereas after 
recognition the attractiveness of the detected face might be the target of evaluation. 
Such an intervention by the effect of facial attractiveness was avoided by controlling the 
stimuli for low variety in this regard.  
The following article thus provides both: empirical evidence for a theoretical 
model of dynamics between semantical instability and appreciation as well as a 
methodological model for assessing such dynamics in a more fine grained way than 
designs employing one or two time points of measurement only.  
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Original article 
 
This work appeared in Muth, C., & Carbon, C. C. (2013). The Aesthetic Aha: On the pleasure of having 
insights into Gestalt. Acta Psychologica, 144(1), 25-30. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2013.05.001. 
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Critical reflection 
The findings of this initial study induce a new perspective on processes involved in the 
perception of semantically instable stimuli: the detection of facial Gestalts within a 
hard-to-solve black and white image induced an increase in the liking of the image 
(Aesthetic Aha effect). By providing a more detailed look at the development of liking 
and clarity of Gestalt over time, we were able to reveal dynamics which are compatible 
with the previously mentioned idea of reward by reduction of prediction errors 
(proposed, e.g., by Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011). In this rationale, the semantical 
instability of the presented stimuli induced uncertainty in the perceivers which was 
reduced by recognition during moments of insight. The increase in prediction accuracy 
thus might have induced the positive affective feedback mirrored by the increases in 
liking.  
There are several interesting points to be discussed concerning the crucial 
mechanism involved in the Aesthetic Aha effect (Muth & Carbon, 2013). First, we can 
ask if it is exclusive for Gestalt recognition or more generally valid for decision making 
and task fulfillment. Chetverikov (2013) summarized findings with regard to preferences 
of real-life decisions and states that “there seems to be a postdecisional ‘spread of 
alternatives’, with chosen items becoming more attractive and non-chosen items 
becoming less attractive” (p. 385). Also in a study by Makin, Wilton, Pecchinenda, and 
Bertamini (2012) people showed positive affective reactions (by smiling) to the target 
which they were asked to look for; and this accounted for symmetry as well as for 
randomness. Consequently, the fulfillment of a task was the relevant predictor of a 
positive physiological reaction and not, e.g., the symmetry itself. The positive effect of 
Gestalt detection could thus be linked to the appeal of task fulfillment—a mechanism 
which might actually be relevant in art perception as well. Despite the lack of a well-
defined task in art perception, the beholder might follow certain goals predefined by 
general perceptual mechanisms (e.g., to reduce uncertainty) or by social convention 
(e.g., to detect stylistic elements as trained in art courses in school). 
More recent findings provide further evidence for an Aesthetic Aha effect (Muth 
& Carbon, 2013). Following a similar rationale and using similar black and white hidden 
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images as we did in the presented study Chetverikov and Filippova (2014) tested the 
effect of recognition on liking by applying a categorization task. They found that correct 
classifications of Gestalts into “human” and “animal” categories were followed by higher 
liking ratings than errors in classification. Classifications into an “object” category 
though proved to be not effective on liking; supposedly due to higher uncertainty about 
the classification. Additionally, Chetverikov and Filippova (2014) manipulated the 
valence of their stimuli—which in our case were kept on a neutral level by controlling 
that none of the faces’ attractiveness differed significantly from the empirical mean. In 
their study, both pleasant and unpleasant pictures were liked more after accurate 
classification. This point is an important argument ruling out the alternative 
interpretation that an Aesthetic Aha (Muth & Carbon, 2013) occurs as we rate the 
valence of the detected Gestalt after its recognition. Still, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that people generally prefer Gestalt-like images over random patterns; in this 
case the reward of the detection itself might play just a minor role.  
In accordance with accounts of reward by an increase in certainty Chetverikov 
and Filippova (2014) propose an affective feedback account of hypotheses testing 
suggesting “that correct hypotheses are reinforced with positive affect even in the 
absence of external feedback” (p. 211). While a moment of insight might reflect a sudden 
increase in processing fluency as well (suggested, e.g., by Topolinski & Reber, 2010), 
liking did not increase with the number of presentation of the stimuli. In the rationale of 
a processing fluency account (for a review see Reber et al., 2004), this should have been 
the case though due to increased familiarity as evident from the mere exposure effect 
(Zajonc, 1968). Furthermore—contrary to mere exposure effects and in line with the 
idea of a positive affective feedback by uncertainty reduction—the Aesthetic Aha effect 
(Muth & Carbon, 2013) takes the quality of elaboration into account: the achievement of 
resolving semantical instability is relevant to appreciation, not the mere increase in 
familiarity.  
This aspect motivates to go one step further by suggesting that the dynamics of 
reward by increasing semantical stability do not necessarily follow the pattern of a 
unidirectional progress (see Figure 6B) but might rather equal—at times sudden and 
even repeated—changes in semantical instability. These are neither limited to one 
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direction nor in number: stability might be gained at one moment and lost again at 
another to be gained once again, etc. (see Figure 6C). As an analogy think of the various 
identifications of the murderer when reading the thriller The Murder of Roger Ackroyd 
by Agatha Christie; you might be misled several times to identify the wrong suspects 
before you gain final insight into the fact that the story's narrator himself is the 
murderer. The idea propagated throughout this thesis is consequently that perception 
and appreciation are no static concepts but dynamically bound to insight-driven 
elaboration, not only in narratives but also if the object itself is relatively stable, not 
undergoing changes besides decay or changes in context—like a painting.  
The next article examines if such insights are beneficial to appreciation even if 
the final insight—catching the murderer so to say—fails to appear. This aspect seems 
especially relevant to semantical instability in art which is (often) not resolvable into a 
determinate interpretation. A transfer to the domain of art perception consequently 
requires at least three extensions of the currently presented state of research:  
A) A replication with regard to art objects: while the domain of objects potentially 
inducing Aesthetic Ahas can be extended from faces to humans, animals, and objects 
with reference to Chetverikov and Filippova (2014), none of these categories might be 
consistent with insightful targets within artworks. Is the revealed mechanism relevant in 
the case of art perception as well?  
B) A differentiation between insight and solution: many artworks might not allow for a 
determinate interpretation but might in contrast provide ongoing indeterminacy or 
incongruence (for instance between form and content, as described in chapter 1.3.2). 
Does the Aesthetic Aha effect also account for partial and peripheral insights not 
providing full determinacy of an artwork’s meaning?  
C) An examination of the need for challenge: as a last point, it might be relevant for the 
effect to occur that the pattern which allows for the rewarding Aha moment poses a 
challenge to the perceiver at first; in other words: it should allow for a “creation of order 
in disorder” (Hekkert & Leder, 2008) by providing disorder in the first place. 
The next two articles, Core publication I and Core publication II, attempt to give first 
answers to these questions by making use of artworks as stimulus material.  
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2.2 Core publication I. Give me Gestalt! Preference for Cubist artworks 
revealing high detectability of objects 
Motivation  
The Aesthetic Aha effect (Muth & Carbon, 2013) contributes to the central aim of this 
thesis by suggesting that the appreciation of challenging objects benefits from insights 
gained during their elaboration. The current section discusses if this effect is also valid 
for the domain of art perception. Another key question is if the rewarding effect 
reported for non-art hidden images is valid only in the light of a determinate 
recognition of a Gestalt—a “solution” in its strictest sense. To see if detectability is also 
beneficial to appreciation if the targets are at most fragmented and the material consists 
of artworks instead of non-art patterns we extended the set of semantical instability 
from hidden images to indeterminate artworks.  
Participants evaluated Cubist artworks on liking and on detectability of objects 
within them to examine if the detectability of Gestalt affects appreciation. Following the 
three crucial preconditions for an extension of the Aesthetic Aha effect to art perception 
discussed in the previous chapter this choice of stimulus material and design allowed us 
to provide first steps to:  
A) A replication with regard to art objects by using Cubist artworks. 
B) A differentiation between insight and solution: In contrast to hidden images—
providing determinate solutions—Cubist artworks are suitable examples of 
indeterminate objects. Although they are evocative of a recognizable Gestalt, they defy 
determinacy by evoking contradictions between perceptual cues. This combination of 
potential recognition and indeterminacy motivates a constant search for Gestalt by the 
perceiver (Gombrich, 1960/2002).  
C) An examination of the need for challenge: this specific kind of ongoing collation or 
conflict between expectation and actual percept in the perception of Cubist artworks 
(Berlyne, 1971) might even be beneficial to the reward by insight.  
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Original article 
 
This work appeared in Muth, C., Pepperell, R., & Carbon, C.-C. (2013). Give Me Gestalt! Preference for 
cubist artworks revealing high detectability of objects. Leonardo, 46(5), 488-489. doi: 
10.1162/LEON_a_00649. See also http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/LEON_a_00649 
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Critical reflection 
The here provided article revealed that we like Cubist artworks more the better we are 
able to discern identifiable objects in them—although they never provide a determinate 
interpretation. This finding was later-on replicated with regard to the duration of 
responses signaling detection and to the likelihood of detection (Muth, Pepperell, & 
Carbon, 2013b). Here, participants pressed a button when they detected objects within 
the artwork. While the first study established a strong relationship between judged 
detectability of Gestalt and liking the second study revealed that people liked Cubist 
artworks more the faster and the more often they detected objects in them. In another 
study on Cubist art, Kuchinke, Trapp, Jacobs, and Leder (2009) found as well that the 
content accessibility—here realized via inversion of ratings on abstractness—was 
positively linked to appreciation. 
There are at least two different ways to interpret the results of these studies: 
Kuchinke et al. (2009) stated that the positive effect of content accessibility on 
appreciation might have been mediated by processing fluency in accordance with the 
Hedonic Fluency Model (Winkielman et al., 2003). Another idea is that the positive 
effect of detectability, speed, and likelihood of detection reflects the opportunity for 
insight provided by non-fluent material. From this perspective, the reported 
relationship between detectability and liking would be in line with theories pointing to 
appeal by a reduction of uncertainty (proposed, e.g., by Dörner & Vehrs, 1975 and Van 
de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011) and the idea of reward by insight (Muth & Carbon, 2013). 
In other words: this alternative reading suggests that artworks were preferred not 
because they were easy to process but because they promised rewarding perceptual 
insights. Note though that this differentiation between a fluency account and the one of 
reward by insight is not clear-cut: Topolinski and Reber (2010) suggest in their fluency 
account of insight that an insight might actually be a “surprising fluency gain in 
processing” (p. 402). And the anticipation of insight might consequently be one of 
increased processing fluency by a solution of indeterminacy. But taken into 
consideration that Cubist artworks are never fully resolvable (Gombrich, 1960/2002), 
this promise was most probably never fulfilled. Instead these artworks provide the 
detection of “fragmented Gestalt”. It can even be speculated that the challenge of 
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fragmentation might have been crucial for appreciation as might have been the 
challenge induced by the seemingly random patterns in the study by Muth & Carbon 
(2013): it is the challenge which enables a rewarding reduction of uncertainty and with 
it a contrast effect on appreciation in the first place. An ongoing level of indeterminacy 
might keep interest for the artwork alive. We can even speculate that without a 
remaining level of semantical instability, appreciation might not have benefited from 
detectability in the same way.  
It is not straight forward to explain the findings in one of these directions on the 
basis of the reported evidence—especially so as the mentioned studies did not clarify 
what “detectability” or “content accessibility” refer to exactly with regard to the 
“fragmented Gestalt” in Cubist artworks. The paradox of the juxtaposition of “fragment” 
and “Gestalt” renders the lack of clarity even more apparent. In other words: the 
discussed empirical accounts did not differ between two factors: A) A determinate 
solution of an indeterminate pattern. We can refer to this as the solvability of 
ambiguity eliciting increased fluency of processing. B) A partial or temporary 
semantical stability within an indeterminate pattern. We can refer to this as a partial, 
temporary, or peripheral insight which does not provide a final solution but might still 
elicit a rewarding Aesthetic Aha. The subsequent study attempted to draw the according 
differentiation between the variables of solvability of ambiguity and strength of insight 
by providing a comparison of their effects on appreciation.  
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2.3 Core publication II. The appeal of challenge in the perception of art: 
how ambiguity, solvability of ambiguity, and the opportunity for insight 
affect appreciation 
Motivation  
So far, evidence was provided for a dynamic relationship between semantical instability 
and appreciation via the rewarding impact of insights (Aesthetic Aha effect, Muth & 
Carbon, 2013). Furthermore, it was shown by the previous study that the detectability of 
objects within Cubist artworks affects liking positively (Muth et al., 2013a). With regard 
to the main question of this thesis we can thus state that the reward by gaining insights 
might be an important factor for the appeal of challenging artworks. But as, e.g., 
Gadamer (1960/2002) points out: “There is no absolute progress and no final 
exhaustion of what lies in a work of art” (p. 100). How could the elaboration of an 
artwork thus be rewarding like the solution of a riddle if many artworks are not even 
“solvable”? Strictly speaking we cannot “master” these artworks to arrive at a 
determinate solution; they don’t even pose a well-defined problem to us. Taking into 
consideration that fluency of processing might be a relevant factor for appreciation, too: 
do such non-easy artworks appeal at all? And if yes, which facets of appreciation are 
affected by them? Also, we should be aware of the point that ambiguity might not be 
pleasing per se but can even be banal (Hyman, 2010). Actually, the persistence of 
residual semantical insolubility might be crucial for an aesthetic experience in contrast 
to a trivial amusement. Does the Rubin-Vase (Figure 3) for instance have strong 
aesthetic qualities or are its resources for rewarding insights depleted too soon? 
 The study reported in this section aims at an according differentiation between 
effects of solvability of ambiguity and strength of insights on appreciation as described 
in the previous chapter. Furthermore, it examines if ambiguity is related to 
appreciation: a multidimensional assessment allows for a specification of the facets of 
appreciation which are relevant candidates for representing the appeal of challenge in 
art.  
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Abstract 
We asked whether and how people appreciate ambiguous artworks and examined the 
possible mechanisms underlying the appeal of perceptual challenge in art. Although 
experimental research has shown people’s particular appreciation for highly familiar and 
prototypical objects that are fluently processed, there is increasing evidence that in the 
arts people often prefer ambiguous materials which are processed less fluently. Here, we 
empirically show that modern and contemporary ambiguous artworks evoking 
perceptual challenge are indeed appreciated. By applying a multilevel modeling 
approach together with multidimensional measurement of aesthetic appreciation, we 
revealed that the higher the subjectively perceived degree of ambiguity within an 
artwork, the more participants liked it and the more interesting and affecting it was for 
them. These dimensions of aesthetic appreciation were also positively related to the 
subjectively reported strength of insights during elaboration of the artworks. The 
estimated solvability of the experienced ambiguity, in contrast, was not relevant for 
liking and even negatively linked to interest and affect. Consequently, we propose a 
critical view of the frequently reported idea that processing (modern) art simply equals a 
kind of problem-solving task. We suggest the dynamic gain of insights during the 
elaboration of an ambiguous artwork, rather than the state of having solved a problem, 
to be a mechanism possibly relevant to the appeal of challenge in the perception of 
ambiguous art. 
 
 
Keywords: Ambiguity, Modern art, Problem solving, Insight, Aesthetic Aha 
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Introduction 
Psychological aesthetics research has repeatedly shown that people like visual stimuli 
that are easy to process; for instance, participants in different studies preferred typical 
objects in comparison to their less typical alternatives (e.g., Halberstadt, 2006) and 
rated familiar faces as being more attractive than less familiar ones (e.g., Langlois, 
Roggman, & Musselman, 1994). The corresponding results are often explained by 
referring to the so-called fluency hypothesis (Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; 
Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998)—although the explanation that fluency always 
increases preference has been challenged only recently (Albrecht & Carbon, 2014). The 
success of many ambiguous or indeterminate pieces of modern art—think of Picasso’s 
famous portraits or the concealing and fragmentation of objects in Cubist artworks—
seems to run counter to the fluency hypothesis as well: Despite challenging our 
perceptual and cognitive habits rather than being easily processed, these items are 
particularly appreciated—in terms of aesthetic as well as monetary value. For a thorough 
investigation of the aesthetic impact of ambiguous art, it is therefore necessary to 
explore mechanisms aside from the fluency of processing. One of these might be the 
possibility of deciphering recognizable patterns, which was described as a relevant factor 
for the success of Cubist artworks, especially those of Picasso, in regard to the art market 
(Muth, Pepperell, & Carbon, 2013). 
 
(How) do we appreciate ambiguity in art? 
Do we indeed appreciate ambiguous art? Evidence from psychological aesthetics makes 
us question the overall appeal of challenging art objects. However, there is evidence in 
favor of the appreciation of perceptual challenge being induced by ambiguity and other 
collative variables like novelty, complexity, uncertainty and conflict (affording collation 
among elements of an object or among actual and expected information, respectively; 
Berlyne, 1971) which includes various dimensions of appreciation and perceptual 
challenge. 
 50 
 Jakesch and Leder (2009) provided a first indication that moderate instead of low 
degrees of ambiguity might be preferred in the domain of art perception. A positive 
connotation of nonfluent material was revealed inter alia for ambiguous surrealistic 
artworks. Though these artworks were rated as being harder to process, they were still 
preferred to their nonambiguous counterparts (Jakesch, Leder, & Forster, 2013). 
Concordant evidence for the appreciation of other, nonfluently processed material was 
found for design objects with low degrees of typicality (Blijlevens, Carbon, Mugge, & 
Schoormans, 2012) as well as for highly innovative and novel design objects (Carbon & 
Schoormans, 2012; Hekkert, Snelders, & van Wieringen, 2003). Furthermore, 
Wittmann, Bunzeck, Dolan, and Düzel (2007) showed that the anticipation of novelty 
alone can already activate the reward system. 
Although these findings relate to liking and reward, the appeal of ambiguous 
artworks might be assignable to other facets of aesthetic appreciation (as well), for 
example, to the powerfulness of affect, which is assumed to cover a wider range of 
emotional reactions toward artworks even if they are not beautiful (Pepperell, 2011). 
Powerfulness of affect was indeed found to increase with the difficulty of object detection 
with regard to indeterminate paintings (Ishai, Fairhall, & Pepperell, 2007). 
Furthermore, ambiguity, novelty, complexity, uncertainty, and conflict were repeatedly 
reported as being positively linked to interest—mostly in a linear fashion (for judged 
complexity see Berlyne, Ogilvie, & Parham, 1968; for high effort and interest see 
Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; for ambiguity see Jakesch et al., 2013). A positive relationship 
between ambiguity and interest was found even when the ambiguous material was 
judged as less beautiful by the beholders (Boselie, 1983; in this case, nonartistic simple 
line drawings which elicit disjunctive ambiguity by offering two incompatible figures 
were used). Turner and Silvia (2006) found that high interest does not necessarily need 
high pleasantness—actually the disturbingness of a painting predicted interest in a 
positive way whereas it was negatively related to pleasantness. Although interest is 
linked to positive emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988), it is separable from enjoyment or 
happiness in several regards: As previously described, perceptual challenge is often 
positively linked to interest but negatively to enjoyment, and effects of interest and 
enjoyment are further divergent (e.g., interest is a better predictor of viewing time than 
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enjoyment, Berlyne, 1971; for an overview on these differences see Silvia, 2006). It seems 
essential for variables associated with affect and interest, respectively, that the stimulus 
or artwork offers some difficulty or at least “a certain amount of disorientation” to the 
perceiver (Berlyne, 1971, p. 215). These factors might come along with uncertainty and 
perceptual challenge thought to be evoked by many ambiguous pieces of art (Jakesch & 
Leder, 2009; Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011) not only during the historical era of 
modernity (Gamboni, 2002).  
In sum, it is reasonable to assume that ambiguity in (modern) art affects these 
two important further dimensions of aesthetic appreciation (i.e., affect and interest), to a 
larger extent than liking. Therefore, we use a multidimensional concept of aesthetic 
appreciation in this study (see Faerber, Leder, Gerger, & Carbon, 2010). 
 
Why might we appreciate ambiguity in art? 
Ambiguity refers to multiple meanings attributed to an object and varies with 
information, context and interaction between an observer and an object (Gaver, Beaver, 
& Benford, 2003). It is thus more a subjective than an objective variable. Consequently, 
in order to understand why ambiguity in art is or can be appreciated, it is important to 
follow an experimental approach that not only focuses on specific features of the 
aesthetic object, but considers the dynamic interplay between observer and artwork 
itself. In reference to appraisal approaches, Silvia (2005b) claimed that “it is misleading 
to assert a general law of stimulus intensity and emotional response that is independent 
of the subjective meaning of the stimulus“ (p. 353). This opposes ideas relating the 
intensity and the arousal-potential of a stimulus to liking (e.g., Berlyne, 1971). 
Approaches that further integrate a dynamic perspective claim, for instance, that 
processes such as (a) running through loops of hypothesis testing during aesthetic 
processing (Carbon & Jakesch, 2013; Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin, 2004) and the 
understanding of art (Leder, Carbon, & Ripsas, 2006), (b) the elaboration of aesthetic 
qualities (Carbon & Leder, 2005), or (c) “struggling” with an ambiguous artwork itself 
bring pleasure (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1999) and influence the aesthetic value we 
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ascribe to it. Accordingly, Hekkert and Leder (2008) assumed that we like patterns that 
“allow us to see relationships or create order” (p. 262). In the case of ambiguous 
artworks, there might be multiple opportunities for such struggling and pattern 
recognition in the course of elaboration. In line with the dynamic perspective, Zeki 
(2004) claimed that “it is not ambiguity itself . . . that is aesthetically pleasing . . . It is 
rather the capacity of multiple experiences” (p. 192). A recent study on repeated 
evaluations of two-tone images (Muth & Carbon, 2013) reported an increase in liking for 
an image when participants detected a hidden Gestalt. Multiple opportunities for 
detection might be able to induce multiple of these so termed Aesthetic Ahas, which 
should, in line with Zeki’s proposal, induce even higher appreciation.  
The Aesthetic Aha effect (Muth & Carbon, 2013), or the impact of perceptual 
insight, respectively, is also in accord with the suggestion of Van de Cruys and 
Wagemans (2011) that an increase in certainty (e.g., by the detection of a face) after the 
encounter of a perceptually difficult situation (e.g., an indeterminate pattern) might be 
rewarding. Berlyne (1971) similarly speculated that for interest we might need both: 
“disorientation” (p. 215) as well as a promise of success after a period of processing. This 
idea was originally linked to his suggestion of rewarded reduction of arousal (Berlyne, 
1960, later he discarded this view, as subsequent studies pointed to links between high 
arousal and reward; see an overview by Silvia, 2006). Although this might be the case for 
some artworks, the question remains whether such a kind of dissolution of uncertainty is 
necessary for assessing the valence of ambiguous art in general. In a study on Cubist art 
(Muth et al., 2013), detectability (i.e., the ease with which objects can be detected within 
the artwork) was indeed strongly correlated with liking. It is important to note that 
Cubist artworks typically “hide” objects, often instruments or bodies; but, in contrast to 
two-tone images, the objects always remain, to a degree, indeterminate so that visual 
searching will continue even after cues have been detected (Gombrich, 1960). Therefore, 
it can be assumed that people do not necessarily have to completely resolve a given 
ambiguity before they can appreciate the respective stimulus. For a person to gain at 
least a partial perceptual or cognitive insight concerning the artwork, it might be 
sufficient to receive just a bit of information or an initial clue. In the case of art, it could 
be important to avoid complete resolution of a given ambiguity so that the piece is not 
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perceived, per Hyman’s (2010) description of less pleasing ambiguities, as “banal, 
conventional or academic, and . . . gimmicky or fanciful or kitsch” (p. 256). 
The question of reward by ambiguity resolution also potentially relates to the role 
of appraisal in art perception: An artwork might be challenging in the eyes and the mind 
of an observer and elicit nonfluency of processing. At the same time, the observer might 
create subjective meaning during the elaboration of the artwork. Rather than solutions 
to the posed “problem” of ambiguity, these self-produced insights might be perceived or 
anticipated as an ability to cope with the challenge posed by the artwork and thus evoke 
the observer’s interest. In terms of appraisal theory, interest might be elicited by a 
combination of two appraisals: one concerning the challenging character of an object 
and the other concerning one’s own ability to cope with this challenge by understanding 
(see Silvia, 2005b).  
Thus, two major lines of argumentation concerning potential mechanisms 
influencing the appreciation of ambiguous art can be identified as follows: 
1. The processing of ambiguous artworks is a kind of problem solving and appreciation is 
influenced by the progress (and result) of ambiguity reduction. 
2. Insights during processing are rewarded irrespective of a progress in regard to 
ambiguity reduction and/or its full resolution. 
 
Who might particularly appreciate ambiguity in art? 
It is important to note that there might be neither the ambiguous object nor a specific 
object with a certain level of ambiguity. In contrast, the intensity of ambiguity might be 
strongly dependent on the recipient’s personality and experience.  
Esthetic appreciation of art, then, may be a route by which the individual obtains mastery over the 
challenges of novelty, complexity, and ambiguity and faces emotion and responds to its challenge 
too . . . But exposing a person to art which can offer challenging experience does not in itself 
guarantee that he will have such experience. He may shut himself off from seeing the complexities, 
he may disregard all features not familiar and realistic. (Child, 1971, p. 9) 
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This description refers to the personality variable termed ambiguity tolerance, which 
might be especially relevant in the perception and appreciation of ambiguity (in art). It 
differentiates among people in regard to their tendency to reduce ambiguous cognitive 
patterns to certainty (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949); their tendency to perceive 
contradictions, inconsistencies and ambiguous information; and to be positively affected 
by it (Reis, 1996). To ambiguity-intolerant people, ambiguous situations or stimuli might 
be perceived as threatening (Budner, 1962). Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) linked the concept 
of ambiguity intolerance to various behavioral features, including perceptual reversals, 
rigidity in categorization, and seeking for certainty. Reis (1996) later classified different 
domains of ambiguity tolerance: ambiguity tolerance for seemingly unsolvable problems, 
for social conflicts, in regard to the image of the parents, for role stereotypes, and for 
new experiences. In sum, there are various instruments measuring ambiguity tolerance, 
whereas a clear operational definition is still missing (Furnham & Marks, 2013). The 
impact of ambiguity tolerance with regard to aesthetic perception and judgment is 
revealed by a few studies that relate higher ambiguity tolerance to preference for surreal 
paintings (but only if they contain few elements, see Furnham & Avison, 1997) and for 
surreal film clips (Swami, Stieger, Pietschnig, & Voracek, 2010). Child and Chapman 
(1973) examined age-dependent links among aesthetic sensitivity and ambiguity 
tolerance and de Bont, Schoormans, and Wessel (1992) showed that people with high 
ambiguity tolerance are more likely to accept unconventional designs than are people 
with low ambiguity tolerance. 
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Table 1 
Examples of how participants described their insights during the elaboration of the 
artworks (obvious spelling mistakes have been corrected for better readability) 
 
Artwork Translated description  Original description (in original wording) 
Bellmer, H. 
(1966). Transfert 
des Sens. 
some of the depicted women look 
directly at the observer  that 
contributes to agitation 
die dargestellten Frauen blicken den 
Betrachter tw. direkt an  das trägt zur 
Unruhe bei 
Bellmer, H. 
(1966). Transfert 
des Sens. 
thrilling to reflect on why bodies are 
intertwined so unclearly, which body 
belongs to whom? Do all love all? 
spannend zu überlegen, warum Körper so 
unklar verschlungen sind, welcher Körper 
gehört wem? Lieben alle alle? 
Bellmer, H. 
(1960). Untitled. 
the longer the observation the clearer 
the forms get, hachures support the 
spacial impression of the object 
je länger die Betrachtung, desto deutlicher 
werden Formen, Schraffuren unterstützen 
räumlichen Objekteindruck 
Boden, B. (1966). 
Kleiner Mann im 
Ohr. 
Sometimes most subtle indication 
suffices to convey a message  By the 
ring, strong look, legs Rest is 
circumstantial 
Manchmal reichen subtilste Andeutungen 
um Botschaft zu übermitteln Durch Ring, 
starker Blick, Beine Rest nebensächlich 
Collien, P. (1964). 
Daphne. 
presumably by the same artist like 
picture 3; vegetable and human are 
not as exclusive as thought 
vermutlich von selben KünstlerIn wie Bild 3; 
Pflanzliches und Menschliches nicht so 
trennscharf wie gedacht 
Cragg, T. (2000). 
Can-Can. 
Assumption what it could be; parts of 
a technical device 
Annahme, was es darstellen könnte; Teile 
aus einem technischen Gerät 
Cragg, T. (2000). 
Can-Can. 
I like the work, it dissolves the black 
and white thinking a bit: something 
can be very massive, heavy and solid 
and at the same time plastic in such a 
way that the work makes a light and 
delicate impression. I see 
furthermore two music instruments 
(most probably two French horns) 
which strengthen the positive 
association with this work. 
Mir gefällt das Werk, es löst das schwarz 
weiß denken ein wenig auf: etwas kann sehr 
massiv, schwer und fest und trotzdem in so 
einer Art verformbar sein, dass das Werk 
einen leichten und filigranen Eindruck 
macht. Ich sehe außerdem zwei 
Musikinstrumente (am ehesten zwei 
Waldhörner), die die positive Assoziation 
mit diesem Werk noch verstärken.  
Gober, R. (1990). 
Untitled. 
This is where the curse word "you 
bag" comes from 
Daher kommt das Schimpfwort „Du Sack“. 
 56 
Maar, D. (1930). 
Doppelporträt 
mit Huteffekt. 
Sometimes when one sits in a train 
and looks out of the window, one 
sees oneself in the pane and one's 
neighbor and the faces mix exactly 
like this 
Manchmal wenn man im Zug sitzt und aus 
dem Fenster schaut sieht man in der Scheibe 
sich und seinen Sitznachbar und die 
Gesichter mischen sich dann genauso. 
Maar, D. (1930). 
Doppelporträt 
mit Huteffekt. 
(…) this is the fascinating thing here. 
The brokenness is not solvable and 
the central motive, terrific. 
(…) Dass ist das Faszinierende hier. Diese 
Zerbrochenheit ist nicht auflösbar und 
zentrales Motiv, grandios. 
Maar, D. (1930). 
Doppelporträt 
mit Huteffekt. 
Clever composition can (with little 
means) also induce an effect. 
Geschickte Anordnung kann (mit wenigen 
Mitteln sonst) auch Effekt bringen.  
Maar, D. (1930). 
Doppelporträt 
mit Huteffekt. 
I interpret the painting like this, that 
a person can have many faces, so can 
be very multifaceted. Here one part is 
proud and intent on doing something 
(the profile with the nose), the other 
part is longing and melancholic. 
Ich interpretiere das Gemälde so, dass eine 
Person mehrerer Gesichter haben kann, also 
sehr facettenreich sein kann. Hier ist ein Teil 
stolz und festentschlossen (das Profil mit der 
Nase), der andere Teil sehnsüchtig und 
wehmütig. 
Magritte, 
R.(1928). Les 
Jours 
Gigantesques. 
It seems to me that the woman is 
threatened by the man; he touches 
her although she does not want that. 
Her hair seems strangely heavy and 
also her face is not very feminine, but 
rather hard and rough and 
frightened. The first impression of a 
dancing, happy woman faded 
entirely+. 
Mir scheint, dass die Frau von dem Mann 
bedroht wird; er fasst sie an obwohl sie das 
nicht möchte. Ihr Haar wirkt seltsam schwer 
und auch ihr Gesicht ist nicht sehr weiblich, 
sondern eher hart und grob und angsterfüllt. 
Der erste Eindruck von der tanzenden, 
fröhlichen Frau ist vollständig 
verschwunden. 
Miller, L. (1937). 
Raumportrait 
Ägypten. 
hm… impression: sadness and 
melancholy, a little bit; at the same 
time also freedom… (This image is 
somehow specifically interesting; it 
has something intangible in its 
effect…) 
hm… Eindruck: Tristesse und Wehmut, ein 
wenig; zugleich aber auch Freiheit… (Dieses 
Bild ist irgendwie besonders interessant; es 
hat etwas Ungreifbares  in seiner Wirkung…) 
Miller, L. (1937). 
Raumportrait 
Ägypten. 
Mirror or image? (upper side of the 
picture) torn cloth= new freedom or 
disappointment as there lies only 
desert behind? 
Spiegel oder Bild? (oben im Bild) zerrissenes 
Tuch= neue Freiheit oder Enttäuschung weil 
dahinter nur Einöde liegt? 
Oppenheim, M. 
(1936). Frühstück 
in Pelz. 
The furred cup might hint at the 
barbaric methods with which we 
partially obtain our food. In everyday 
life, and what would be less mundane 
than drinking a cup of tea, we are 
repeatedly pointed to that, the cup of 
fur (like ”tearing the fur over the 
Die fellerne Tasse könnte auf die 
barbarischen Methoden hinweisen mit 
denen wir z.T. unsere Lebensmittel 
gewinnen. Im Alltag, und was könnte 
weniger alltäglich sein als eine Tasse Tee zu 
trinken, werden wir immer wieder darauf 
hingewiesen, die Tasse aus Fell (wie "das 
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ears“) [in German meaning 
something like ”to take someone for 
a ride“] imposes on us how cruel and 
inhuman or -animalistic, 
respectively, some food production is 
(...)  
Fell über die Ohren ziehen") drängt einem 
gerade auf wie grausam und tier-/ bzw. 
menschenverachtend manche 
Lebensmittelerstellung ist (...) 
Oppenheim, M. 
(1938). Steinfrau. 
from the warm colors the picture 
seems peaceful, the woman is almost 
like a Rubens-woman 
durch die warmen Farben wirkt das Bild 
friedlich, die Frau fast wie eine Rubens-Frau 
Teige, K. (1951). 
Collage 374. 
Insight is hard to say; thoughts 
alternate constantly between the 
different aspects of the image. And I 
wonder; why does the picture seem a 
little bit spooky 
Einsicht schwer zu sagen; Gedanken 
wechseln dauernd zwischen den 
verschiedenen Bildaspekten hin und her. 
Und frage mich; warum das Bild etwas 
gespenstisch wirkt 
Teige, K. (1951). 
Collage 374. 
grotesque motives besides the image 
(female body, breast) demarcate 
themselves strongly from the 
landscape in terms of color and 
technique. 
groteske bildfremde Motive (Frauenkörper, 
Brust) grenzen sich zur Landschaft farblich 
wie technisch stark ab 
Teige, K. (1951). 
Collage 374. 
Reference moon/ female cycle? 
Moon in pre-Columbian cultures of 
central America always female 
(goddess of the moon); also in the 
Romance languages "the" moon is 
female… 
Bezug Mond/ weiblicher Zyklus? Mond z.B. 
in präkolumbianischen Kulturen 
Mittelamerikas immer weiblich 
(Mondgöttin); auch in den romanischen 
Sprachen ist "der" Mond weiblich... 
Thiele, P. (1984). 
Der große 
Bruder. 
We "tinker" (mentally) a lot together, 
what artists again know and use. 
And: somehow one is happy about 
the "hidden" image (otherwise this 
work here would maybe be boring…) 
Wir „basteln“ (gedanklich) viel zusammen, 
was Künstler wiederum wissen und sich zu 
Nutze machen. Und: irgendwie freut man 
sich doch über das „versteckte“ Bild (sonst 
wäre das Werk hier vielleicht langweilig…) 
Thiele, P. (1984). 
Der große 
Bruder. 
it is fun to look at the many small 
details, I wonder whether the life of 
the old man is shown in the little 
pictures 
macht Spaß, die vielen kleinen Details 
anzusehen, ich frage mich, ob wohl das 
Leben des alten Mannes in den kleinen 
Bildern gezeigt ist 
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Research questions and hypotheses 
The present study asks how and why people appreciate perceptually challenging, 
ambiguous artworks. We aimed to shed further light on the appreciation of artworks that 
are ambiguous and therefore cannot be processed fluently. The theoretical ideas and 
empirical findings described in the introductory paragraphs of this article suggest that 
appreciation of non fluent material might consist in its positive effects on dimensions 
aside from the typically measured liking, such as interest and affect. We thus used a 
three-dimensional concept of aesthetic appreciation and expected ambiguity to primarily 
affect the aesthetic appreciation dimensions interest and affect (see also Faerber et al., 
2010). As artworks can potentially have a different effect on perception than on 
cognition (Carbon & Jakesch, 2013; Leder et al., 2004), we further differentiated 
between perceptual affect and cognitive affect in the present study.  
As described above, two different processes can be considered as potentially 
underlying the appeal of ambiguity in art: the reward by insights triggered during the 
processing of ambiguous material and the reward by solvability of ambiguity. 
Accordingly, we compared the effects of strength of insights and solvability of ambiguity 
on aesthetic appreciation. “Insights,” in the terms used here, might refer to perceptual 
insights (e.g., an emergent Gestalt), cognitive insights (e.g., stylistic aspects or symbolic 
interpretations) or reflexive insights (e.g., into one’s own perceptual mechanisms) 
during the perception of ambiguous art (see Table 1 for examples extracted from free 
descriptions of insights by participants looking at ambiguous visual artworks in the 
course of the study). We supposed that the factor strength of insights might be more 
crucial for the aesthetic appreciation of ambiguous artworks than the estimated 
solvability of ambiguity (e.g., how easy it is to resolve via elaboration the “riddle” posed 
by the ambiguous artwork). In order to account for differences in personality between 
participants, we assessed ambiguity tolerance via the IMA questionnaire (Inventory for 
Measuring tolerance of Ambiguity, Reis, 1996). 
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Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-nine participants took part in the experiment on a voluntary basis (21 female and 
18 male; age range [years] = 18–41, M = 25.0, SD = 5.9). One additional dataset was 
excluded from the analysis because of monotonous response behavior to avoid higher 
error variance of the experimental result, an effect recently reported in regard to 
participants’ inattention (Maniaci & Rogge, 2014). A Snellen eye chart test and a subset 
of the Ishihara color cards assured that all of them had normal or corrected-to-normal 
visual acuity and normal color vision. The participants were naïve to the purpose of the 
study and did not have any training in art or art history besides regular school education. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli 
Photographs of 17 ambiguous artworks of the 20th and 21st centuries were shown on an 
LG W2220P screen with a 22-in screen size at a resolution of 1680 X 1050 pixels. Of 
each stimulus, an additional paper-mounted version was created using a color print of 
the respective artwork. A list of the artworks used can be found in Table 2. To assess 
participants’ level of ambiguity tolerance, we used the “Inventar zur Messung der 
Ambiguitätstoleranz” (Inventory for Measuring tolerance of Ambiguity; IMA) by Reis 
(1996) comprising 40 items that reflect four subscales describing the various domains of 
ambiguity, including ambiguity tolerance for seemingly unsolvable problems, for social 
conflicts, in regard to the image of the parents, for role stereotypes, and for new 
experiences (internal consistencies of scales are between Cronbach’s α=.74 and α=.86; 
entire scale: α=.87).  
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Table 2 
The study used photographs of the following artworks: 
 
Artist Year of creation Title 
Bellmer, H. 1960 Untitled 
Bellmer, H.  1966 Transfert des Sens 
Boden, B. 1966 Kleiner Mann im Ohr 
Breitling, G. 1966 Maleditia Calumnia 
Collien, P. 1964 Daphne 
Coste, C.  2007 Corps viscéral V 
Cragg, T. 2000 Can-Can 
Gober, R. 1990 Untitled 
Lin, W.  2004 Landscape 
Maar, D. 1930 Doppelporträt mit Huteffekt 
Magritte, R.  1928 Les Jours Gigantesques 
Miller, L. 1937 Raumportrait Ägypten 
Oppenheim, M. 1936 Frühstück in Pelz 
Oppenheim, M. 1938 Steinfrau 
Táborský, H. 1933 Self portrait 2 
Teige, K. 1951 Collage 374 
Thiele, P. 1984 Der große Bruder 
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Procedure 
The experiment consisted of two phases (see Figure 1) with a fixed order of blocks. The 
first phase comprised five rating blocks in which all stimuli were shown in randomized 
order. During the rating blocks, the participants sat at an approximate distance of 55 cm 
in front of the screen and rated the stimuli with regard to the following variables: (1) 
liking, (2) interest, (3) powerfulness of affect (“how strong does the artwork affect 
you?”), (4) perceptual affect (“how strong does the artwork affect your perception?”), 
and (5) cognitive affect (“how strong does the artwork affect your thoughts?”), 
respectively, using a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much). Blocks 4 and 5 were introduced to discern relevant elements of the variable 
powerfulness of affect. 
In the second phase of the experiment, the participants saw the whole set of 
stimuli again, this time in a fixed, nonrandomized order. Participants rated each picture 
concerning its degree of ambiguity, described the ambiguities they perceived in the 
picture in a free-typed report on a second computer (viewing an additional paper-
mounted version of the according picture, no time constraints), rated the level of 
solvability of ambiguity, described their insights in a free-typed report on a second 
computer (viewing an additional paper-mounted version of the according picture, no 
time constraints) and rated the strength of their insights. The rating scales followed the 
same scheme as before (i.e., Likert-type scales, ranging from 1 [not at all] to 7 [very 
much]). Description phases were introduced to guarantee that the collected ratings for 
the solvability of ambiguity and the strength of insights were based on deep elaboration 
of the material. Pictures were shown in a nonrandomized order to avoid participant 
distraction due to the reordering of the paper-mounted versions by the experimenter. 
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Figure 1. Procedure of the study. Example for stimulus material: Adapted from “Les 
Jours Gigantesques” by R. Magritte, 1928, Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Düsseldorf. Copyright 2014 by VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn, Germany. Black bars symbolize 
rating trials; sheets of paper symbolize trials in which a free report on ambiguities within 
the artwork or on evoked insights were typed in. See the online article for the color 
version of this figure. 
 
Results and discussion 
Following Silvia’s (2007) proposal to consider the use of multilevel modeling for 
research in psychological aesthetics, we analyzed the data accordingly. This kind of 
analysis allows for testing within-person effects that are particularly interesting in a field 
in which standards of evaluation are hardly achievable (thus scaling of aesthetic 
appreciation potentially differs to a high degree between subjects). The experimental 
design also called for multilevel models because we were interested in how personality 
factors such as tolerance of ambiguity modulate the aesthetic appreciation of ambiguity, 
solvability of ambiguity, and strength of insights during the processing of the artworks. 
We thus conducted five identically structured multilevel models, one for each of the five 
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dependent variables (each person–mean centered): (1) liking, (2) interest, (3) 
powerfulness of affect, (4) perceptual affect, and (5) cognitive affect. 
Each multilevel model contained the following predictor structure as fixed 
coefficients: (a) ambiguity aspects of the artworks (ambiguity, solvability of ambiguity, 
and strength of insights), each variable centered on the stimulus mean; (b) interactions 
of ambiguity aspects with personality factors (tolerance of ambiguity: problem solving 
[IMA-PR] and open for experiences [IMA-OE]), each factor centered on the grand mean; 
(c) ambiguity aspects of the artworks, but this time each variable as stimulus mean. 
Additionally, we fed the models with random coefficients regarding ambiguity aspects of 
the artworks, each variable centered on the stimulus mean. The models also contained 
the 17 stimuli as repeated effects yielding a total number of 34 parameters. To increase 
the readability of the data analysis, we have presented all significant effects in an overall 
table comprising all five multilevel models (see Table 3).  
Table 3 
Results of the five multilevel models 
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For all models—meaning for all dependent variables—we revealed significant 
positive effects of ambiguity (centered on the stimulus mean): the higher participants 
assessed the ambiguity of a stimulus, the more they appreciated it in terms of liking, 
interest, affect, perceptual affect and cognitive affect. The same was the case for strength 
of insights. Importantly, these main effects were only modulated by personality factors 
for liking and cognitive affect: When IMA-PR was higher, ambiguity was more 
appreciated in terms of liking and cognitive affect—these modulations as well as the 
main effect of ambiguity on both variables are also illustrated in Figure 2 (for liking) and 
Figure 3 (for cognitive affect). We can detect that the majority of persons (each 
regression line refers to one single participant) showed a positive relationship between 
ambiguity and the corresponding dependent variable, but people who showed low IMA-
PR scores more often tended to break this general trend—although this effect is of course 
far from being clear-cut. IMA-PR additionally showed an interactive effect with 
solvability of ambiguity. People who assessed the solvability of ambiguity in a picture as 
being higher were more cognitively affected the higher they scored on the IMA-PR scale. 
Furthermore, we detected several effects on the mean ratings of stimulus properties, 
such as positive effects of ambiguity on perceptual affect and cognitive affect, negative 
effects of solvability of ambiguity on interest and affect, a positive effect of solvability of 
ambiguity on perceptual affect and positive effects of strength of insights on all variables 
but only a trend with regards to perceptual affect. 
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Figure 2. Relationship between ambiguity (i.e., ambiguity-deviation) and liking (person-
mean centered) for persons with low versus high scores in the IMA-PR (deviation from 
grand mean), expressed as within-person analyses. The thicker the line the stronger the 
degree of deviation of IMA-PR from the grand mean (exact IMA-PR scores as deviations 
from the grand mean are given for each regression at the right end of the regarding line). 
See the online article for the color version of this figure. 
At least two major conclusions can be drawn from the whole bunch of analyses: First, the 
complexity of the data pattern demonstrates how important it is to use a 
multidimensional approach to do justice to the multiple facets of ambiguity—most 
importantly, we have to differentiate between aspects of ambiguity, solvability of 
ambiguity and strength of insights. We could not find any evidence that the solvability of 
ambiguity is an important factor for appreciating ambiguity. There is a direct 
relationship of solvability to interest as well as affect, but contrary to simple ideas of art 
perception as a kind of problem solving it is a negative one. Second, although exerting 
only a modest influence, specific and art-relevant personality factors such as tolerance of 
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ambiguity seem to be promising candidates to explain person-specific effects in regard to 
the appreciation of artworks, especially to those artworks that do not offer one 
determinate meaning.  
 
Figure 3. Relationship between ambiguity (i.e., ambiguity-deviation) and cognitive affect 
(person-mean centered) for persons with low versus high scores in the IMA-PR 
(deviation from grand mean), expressed as within-person analyses. The thicker the line 
the stronger the degree of deviation of IMA-PR from the grand mean (exact IMA-PR 
scores as deviations from the grand mean are given for each regression at the right end 
of the regarding line). See the online article for the color version of this figure. 
 
 
 
 67 
General discussion 
We asked how and why beholders appreciate ambiguity in art. In contrast to previous 
reports, we found no evidence for a pref- erence for low (Reber et al., 2004) or moderate 
(Jakesch & Leder, 2009) levels of ambiguity but a clear positive relation of high levels of 
ambiguity with liking, interest and powerfulness of (perceptual and cognitive) affect. We 
revealed the largest effect for interest—which indicates that this dimension is especially 
crucial concerning the aesthetic appreciation of ambiguity in modern art.  
The appraisal approach to aesthetic emotions as proposed, for example, by Silvia 
(2005a) essentially defines aesthetic emotions as based on cognitive evaluations (that 
are expected to be, most often but not necessarily, unconscious and automatic). This 
means how the recipient will react to an artwork cannot simply be reduced to objectively 
measurable properties, but depends on the perceiver’s subjective perception and 
experience of the respective aesthetic object. The appraisal approach further states that 
different aesthetic emotions are each based on specific appraisal structures which are 
understood in terms of specific combinations of multiple appraisal components. 
Common appraisal components suggested by appraisal theorists are, for instance, 
novelty, intrinsic pleasantness, certainty/predictability, goal significance, agency, coping 
potential and compatibility with social or personal standards (Ellsworth & Scherer, 
2003). For the aesthetic emotion “interest” Silvia (2005a) suggests two main appraisal 
components: first, the appraisal of novelty (related properties are: being “new, sudden, 
unfamiliar, ambiguous, complex, obscure, uncertain, mysterious, contradictory, 
unexpected, or otherwise not understood” p. 122) and, second, the appraisal of one’s 
own potential to cope with that object (“people’s appraisal of whether they can 
understand the ambiguous event” p. 122). In the present study, we investigated different 
kinds of coping with ambiguity: the subjectively estimated strength of insights and the 
subjective solvability of ambiguity. Strength of insights during the elaboration of an 
artwork was found to be a significant indicator for aesthetic appreciation. This linkage of 
insights to (aesthetic) emotions is in accord with ideas that stress interactionist features 
of art processing rather than the search for effects of objective features of an aesthetic 
object. The relevance of personality factors like ambiguity tolerance furthermore 
underlines this point. 
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Uncertainty reduction might be rewarding (Dörner & Vehrs, 1975; Van de Cruys & 
Wagemans, 2011); however, a complete resolution of ambiguity is not necessary for the 
appreciation of an artwork (see, for instance, Leder et al., 2004). In our study, subjective 
solvability of ambiguity indeed was not significantly linked to liking and was even 
negatively linked to interest and affect. Taken together, these two findings could mean 
that insights are linked to appreciation even (or even more so) if the problem posed by 
the present ambiguity stays unsolved during processing. This is a conceptual challenge, 
if we understand both variables as being related to problem solving. Examples of 
participants’ insight descriptions (see Table 1), however, might help to discern them on a 
theoretical basis: for instance, one participant described her insight into René Magritte’s 
(1928) Les Jours Gigantèsques (see Figure 1) simply as: “the insight is, that I cannot fully 
solve the picture.” Others described insights on the level of the content of the piece (e.g., 
identifying the scene as a rape), sudden Gestalt perception (when detecting a second 
person in the picture), insights into one’s own perceptual mechanisms (e.g., “I recognize 
something although it is not really there”) or into one’s own affective reactions (e.g., 
“maybe I am so disgusted because . . .”). Reflective statements like that first cited above 
particularly exemplify that insights during the processing of an artwork can be triggered 
by the ambiguity of the artwork without resolving it. This point might be a usable 
extension to Leder et al.’s (2004) model of aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic 
judgments, in which evaluation is linked to cognitive mastering by a loop “in relation to 
their success in either revealing a satisfying understanding, successful cognitive 
mastering or expected changes in the level of ambiguity“ (p. 499). We also suggest that 
insights—which do not necessarily resolve or promise to resolve the ambiguity of an 
artwork—might positively influence aesthetic evaluation. At the same time, ambiguity 
and the expectation of its resolution might be a motivation for (prolonged) involvement 
in art perception in the first place. This is in accord with our finding that ambiguity is 
linked to interest which has repeatedly been reported to motivate exploration and 
engagement (Izard & Ackermann, 2000; for an overview on the motivational effects of 
interest see Silvia, 2006). The variance in people’s descriptions of a single stimulus 
furthermore reveals that an object is not ambiguous, interesting or affecting per se but 
only as a consequence of people’s active elaboration of it.  
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Beyond this, it is plausible that if interest needs “disorientation” (Berlyne, 1971, p. 
215), ambiguity should not be too easily decipherable in order to be—or stay—
interesting. Furthermore these findings might explain how artworks can be appealing 
without offering a determinate solution or interpretation, respectively (cf., Muth et al., 
2013 for Cubist artworks).  
It is important to note that the concept of insight used by our participants is not 
entirely in accordance with a classical definition of insight (Einsicht, in German) as the 
sudden, smooth and fluent solution to a problem (see, e.g., Bowden, Jung-Beeman, 
Fleck, & Kounios, 2005). Taking our participants’ descriptions into account, insight 
might also be construed as the sudden understanding of something after all (“Oh yes, I 
see that . . .”) whereas this “something” does not (fully) dissolve a problem that was 
directly posed by the ambiguity of the artwork. Another case of nonclassical insights is 
given by Cubist artworks that force the perceiver to restart their search for identifiable 
objects again and again by offering contradictory cues (Gombrich, 1960): although the 
perceiver will never reach a definite solution, there are insightful moments marked by a 
relative stability of meaning. As these examples show, aesthetics research is potentially 
confronted with different kinds of insights in the context of art perception. This must 
also be taken into account when dealing with the question of whether insights in art 
perception are produced by analytic thinking or rather by a process involving insight-
specific mechanisms (e.g., recomposing) or by a combination of both (see, e.g., Bowden 
et al., 2005; see also Weisberg, who offers an integrative approach to this topic). On the 
one hand we can state that not every artwork poses a classical insight problem: although 
they often challenge the perceiver, artworks do not always offer unexpected sudden 
solutions. On the other hand artworks are not riddles to be solved via analytic steps (as 
exemplified by Cubist artworks). In contrast: the differentiation between solvability of 
ambiguity and strength of insight as described above reveals that people might well also 
experience insight (in the broad sense) even if it does not refer to a previously perceived 
problem, and that an insight does not necessarily have to lead to the solution of any such 
problem at all in order to be appreciated. 
Our results further support the notion that, in order to advance toward the 
specific insights to be gained from ambiguous and challenging artworks, the dynamics of 
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stability and instability of meaning during elaboration must be taken into account. Such 
a dynamic perspective also allows for recognition of the multiplicity of insights that one 
and the same artwork can offer: during elaboration the perceiver gets into various 
shades of the piece, each of which might present another subproblem or challenge 
offering the opportunity for another insight. Such subproblems concern, for instance, 
the “style” of an artwork (eventually leading to an insight via a categorization of the 
features), or the sujet (eventually leading to insightful associations, for instance on the 
social role of women in the 18th century), or even the “insolvability” of indeterminacy 
itself (eventually evoking a gain of insight on own perceptual mechanisms). Importantly, 
these subproblems are connected within the artwork, this way a certain style might 
influence the associations we have concerning the sujet and ambiguities among them 
form new subproblems (evident, for instance, in artworks from the postexpressionist art 
stream of New Objectivity, i.e., Neue Sachlichkeit, in German). 
 
Conclusion 
In the present study, we investigated the effect of ambiguity on a rather broad, 
multidimensional concept of aesthetic appreciation which we measured using the 
variables liking, interest, powerfulness of affect, perceptual affect and cognitive affect. 
Taking these diverse key dimensions of appreciation of ambiguous art into 
consideration, a fine-grained  picture of aesthetic processing emerged that allows us to 
further specify the involved mechanisms. We asked whether the solvability of ambiguity 
was really crucial for the aesthetic appreciation of ambiguous modern artworks, as is 
supposed by ideas that consider the processing of modern art as a kind of problem-
solving. Our results did not confirm the according claims but suggest, in contrast, that 
the subjective strength of insights to be gained from an artwork is the most important 
factor here. Consequently, we advocate that the process of elaborating ambiguous 
artworks and gaining insights, rather than the state of having solved “a problem” posed 
by these artworks, is essential for explaining the aesthetic appreciation they receive. It is 
also important to note that further variables beyond liking seem to be highly relevant 
especially for modern artworks—above all interest. The role of ambiguity tolerance is yet 
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to be clarified but our preliminary findings highlight the potential relevance of this 
personality variable in regard to the relationship between liking and ambiguity.  
To sum up, the various and diverse streams of modern art might prevent us from 
getting easy clues about how such works appeal to us, but if we integrate further 
variables associated with aesthetic appreciation, for example, interest and powerfulness 
of affect, as well as personality factors like ambiguity tolerance we might obtain deeper 
insights into how pieces of ambiguous art prompt such strong aesthetic experiences as 
they do. 
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Critical reflection 
The reported study clearly reveals: yes, we can derive pleasure from artworks which defy 
a fully determinate interpretation. This accounts not only for liking, but as well for 
interest and affect. Furthermore, it gives an idea of how the appeal of challenge evolves 
in line with previous speculations drawn on the basis of the Aesthetic Aha effect (Muth & 
Carbon, 2013) and on findings of preference for Cubist artworks providing high 
detectability of objects (Muth et al., 2013a): the strength of insights induced by an 
artwork has a significant impact on appreciation. Also, these rewarded insights do not 
have to lead to a resolution of ambiguity to make the artwork appeal. In contrast: 
solvability of ambiguity was found to be negatively related to interest as well as to affect. 
These results neither rule out nor contradict that high processing fluency (e.g., 
Reber et al., 2004) or uncertainty reduction (e.g., Dörner & Vehrs, 1975; Van de Cruys & 
Wagemans, 2011) are pleasurable. In contrast, it seems reasonable to assume that these 
approaches are related to each other. For instance, although solvability of ambiguity 
was not a positive predictor of appreciation, the expectation of ambiguity resolution or 
of an increase in processing fluency might have motivated the elaboration of an 
ambiguous artwork in the first place. We can furthermore assume that processing 
fluency indeed might temporarily increase at moments of insight (as suggested by 
Topolinski & Reber, 2010). The crucial point is that we have to take dynamics into 
account: an experience of an artwork might neither equal the pattern of unidirectional 
progress with regard to uncertainty reduction nor might it include a “finish line” which 
we cross when we “solve the riddle”. Instead we can imagine different phases of 
elaboration marked by indeterminacy and uncertainty but also by moments of insight, a 
fleeting stability of meaning. Furthermore, expectations might change as we suddenly 
detect either mismatches or links between elements which did not appear to us before. 
As it was visualized above in Figure 6C, the resulting dynamic model of these processes 
thus resembles reoccurring changes between ups and downs in semantical instability 
rather than static or progressive patterns. Furthermore, we can even think of artworks 
which provide indeterminacy by random forms but conceptual determinacy as well—
analogous to the differentiation into perceptual versus conceptual fluency (see, e.g., 
Reber, et al., 2004).  
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With reference to the main question of this thesis—how semantical instability in 
art can induce pleasure—we can state that evidence reported so far suggests the 
relevance of a specific mechanism: reward can be gained by the induction of insights—
the activity of sense-making itself. To transfer this effect to the domain of art perception, 
three conditions were set up. Their fulfillment can be further supported by the present 
results of Core publication II: 
A) A replication with regard to art objects was achieved by utilizing Cubist artworks in 
Core publication I and a set of modern and postmodern artworks in Core publication II. 
B) A differentiation between insight and solution was explicitly drawn on the basis of 
subjective ratings on according concepts and an extensive theoretical discussion by Core 
publication II. The here reported findings furthermore give an explanation of the finding 
reported in Core publication I that the detectability of objects within indeterminate 
artworks increased liking without providing a determinate interpretation: not the 
solution of ambiguity might be the relevant factor here, but the promise of a gain of 
insight. 
C) As speculated for Cubist artworks in Core publication I, the current findings of Core 
publication II suggest that the appeal of art might benefit from a remnant of semantical 
instability—especially with regard to the variable of interest. It might thus be crucial for 
appreciation that the struggle with semantical instability is not fully resolvable by 
elaboration.  
In conclusion, the current findings suggest that sense-making might itself be 
rewarding even if semantical instability is not entirely resolved during the process. They 
furthermore indicate that interest is a promising variable which seems crucial for the 
appeal of challenge in art and hereby points to the relevance of a multidimensional 
account of appreciation. The last research project to be presented attempted accordingly 
to integrate the dynamics of the Aesthetic Aha effect with multidimensionality. To do so, 
it refined the previous findings with regard to temporal resolution of changes in 
perception and appreciation and with regard to the inclusion of further relevant factors. 
Before its presentation an additional publication provides its necessary methodological 
grounds.  
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2.4 Peripheral publication II. M5oX: Methoden zur multidimensionalen und 
dynamischen Erfassung des Nutzererlebens  
Motivation 
Before we could assess changes in perception and appreciation of artworks in a more 
fine-grained way, it was necessary to develop a procedure and a device capturing a 
continuous stream of data. The following article discusses how methodological 
approaches in psycho-aesthetics vary with regard to the captured dimensions of an 
experience as well as to the temporal resolution of the captured dynamics. Furthermore, 
it provides examples of continuous measurements—among them the method which was 
used in the subsequently presented research project.  
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Critical reflection 
This article provided an overview on methodological approaches to assess user 
experiences in different domains. Their quality can be estimated via two main factors: 
the number of captured dimensions of experience and the temporal resolution of the 
captured dynamics. Psychological approaches often focus on high dimensionality of the 
assessed variables but exclude their dynamics by applying one time point of 
measurement only. As mentioned above, the Repeated Evaluation Technique (RET, 
Carbon & Leder, 2005) comprises two time points of evaluation and thereby allows for 
the investigation of effects of elaboration on appreciation. Additional time points of 
measurement—as in Muth and Carbon (2013; see Peripheral publication I)—increase the 
resolution of dynamics of evaluation. But with increasing temporal resolution the 
number of assessable dimensions decreases as well. Continuous assessments allow for 
one dimension only unless combined with parallel or subsequent testing. A dynamic 
approach to the appeal of ambiguous artworks requires a tool which measures 
continuous data but still allows for multidimensionality. The subsequent publication 
utilized such a Continuous Evaluation Procedure (CEP, Muth, Raab, & Carbon, 2015) 
consisting of a slider box as described in the precedent article capturing data without 
time delay (for a visualization of the CEP see Figure 7). A combination of several 
assessments of continuous streams of data provided high temporal resolution as well as 
multidimensionality of the experience of indeterminate artistic movies.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Application of the Continuous evaluation Procedure (CEP) 
in the study by Muth et al. (2015). 
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2.5 Core publication III. The stream of experience when watching artistic 
movies. Dynamic aesthetic effects revealed by the Continuous Evaluation 
Procedure (CEP) 
Motivation  
Evidence provided by the first three publications presented within this thesis suggested 
one mechanism relevant to the appeal of semantical instability in art: sense-making is 
rewarding by itself; we can gain pleasure by insights during elaboration even if 
semantical instability is not entirely resolved. If this pleasure is then attributed to the 
elaborated object, appreciation temporarily increases. With reference to the proposed 
model in Figure 6C, we can ask how the actual pattern of involved processes looks like: 
which kinds of changes precede the moment of insight and does appreciation actually 
increase immediately after it (as in Peripheral publication I; Muth & Carbon, 2013)? 
Furthermore, findings of the appeal of indeterminate art—which does not provide a 
determinate interpretation—led to the idea that not only the actual insight but also the 
promise of success might be effective on appreciation (see discussion of Core publication 
I, Muth et al., 2013a, and discussion of Core publication II, Muth, Hesslinger, et al., 
2015). This might be especially relevant to the variable of interest which was claimed to 
be qualified by a combination of disorientation and anticipation of success (Berlyne, 
1971) or complexity and comprehensibility, respectively (Silvia, 2005). As Core 
publication II suggested, a multidimensional account of appreciation might therefore be 
highly fruitful (Muth, Hesslinger, et al., 2015). 
The major aim of the next research project was consequently to set up a refined 
model of the appeal of semantical instability in art which integrates dynamic effects not 
only of moments of insight but also of their anticipation on multiple dimensions of 
appreciation. An ideal artistic material to study these effects was found in the stop-
motion movies presented in the beginning of this thesis (see Figure 1 and Supplementary 
material 1). Like the black and white non-art pictures which were used as stimulus 
material in the initial study on the Aesthetic Aha effect (Muth & Carbon, 2013) these 
movies share qualities inherent to hidden images: they contain indeterminate as well as 
determinate phases during the evolution of a drawing. For this purpose, I repeatedly 
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took photographs of actual states of the drawing and integrated them via the stop-
motion-technique to a film which enables the viewer to follow the development and 
metamorphosis of Gestalt within the drawing. In contrast to the black and white pictures 
utilized before, this stimulus material provided moving pictures with different degrees of 
indeterminacy. This enabled us to characterize stages of the movie (and thus of the 
represented drawing) with regard to complexity, to the opportunity for insight, and to 
several facets of appreciation.   
To achieve a fine grained assessment of this data for each frame of the movie, we 
applied the Continuous Evaluation Procedure (CEP; see previous chapter and Figure 7). 
That way we were able to retrace how liking and interest change with reference to 
moments of insight: if interest is actually elicited by an increase of complexity together 
with a promise of understanding (as proposed by Berlyne, 1971, and Silvia, 2005) the 
continuous stream of interest would show an increase during an increase in complexity 
of the movie and already before moments of insight. Liking should—in contrast—
increase shortly after moments of insight according to the Aesthetic Aha effect (Muth & 
Carbon, 2013). Furthermore, we were interested in the different facets of the conscious 
experience of insights gained during the perception of the movie and thus collected short 
written reports. 
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Supplementary Material A | The movie utilized as stimulus material can 
be watched here: http://vimeo.com/46138003. 
 
Supplementary Material B | Impressions regarding the exhibition at 
the “Griesbadgalerie” can be gained here: 
http://vimeo.com/68991518. 
 
Supplementary Material C | A visualization of the development of 
moments of insight can be found here: https://janus.allgpsych.uni 
-bamberg.de/CEP_Revision/insightlow.html. 
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Critical reflection 
Perception and appreciation of semantical instability in art is dynamic and thus not 
entirely accessible via one time point only. To understand how meaning and aesthetic 
experiences unfold we thus have to look at the continuous stream of experience. The 
reported research project adopted such a dynamic perspective and revealed that an 
insightful moment changes not only an artwork’s semantical instability but its aesthetic 
impact as well. Via a multidimensional account this influence could be specified for 
different facets of appreciation: as expected—and in line with the Aesthetic Aha effect 
(Muth & Carbon, 2013)—liking increased at moments of insight. Interest—in contrast—
increased already before moments of insight. This reflects the idea brought forward in 
the discussion of Core publication I (Muth et al., 2013a) and Core publication II (Muth, 
Hesslinger, et al., 2015) that the anticipation of insight might already be effective on 
appreciation before the actual Aha moment.  
The preliminary model presented in the currently discussed article is indeed able 
to integrate such dynamic effects as well as multiple dimensions of appreciation: it states 
that complexity arouses an orienting reaction (as suggested by Berlyne, 1971) which 
induces heightened interest as well as the likeliness of rewarding moments of insight. 
These Aha moments are followed by an increase of liking. Concerning this last step, 
further research should take an additional potential factor into consideration: the role of 
the Gestalt’s valence. It is plausible to assume that—despite the finding by Chetverikov 
and Filippova (2014) that the correct identification is rewarding in all cases— some of 
the insights gained during elaboration could induce a negative effect due to negative 
valence of the revealed motive, interpretation, or idea. The Fluency Amplification Model 
by Albrecht and Carbon (2014) similarly claims that fluency does not simply increase 
appreciation but amplifies it in the direction of an object’s valence. 
Finally, a clarification of the phenomenological quality of insights induced by an 
artwork can be inspired by the qualitative data on different facets of the experience of 
insights provided by the article. It seems that feelings of coping are as relevant to this 
experience as relations between perception and expectation. Also, there might be crucial 
differences between the experiences of persons with regard to their focus when 
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confronted with indeterminate and hidden objects: their descriptions targeted processes 
leading towards or away from Gestalt or concerned resulting Gestalts only.  
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General discussion 
In 1935, Picasso stated: 
A picture is not thought out and settled beforehand. While it is being done it changes as 
one’s thoughts change. And when it is finished, it still goes on changing, according to the 
state of mind of whoever is looking at it. A picture lives a life like a living creature (…). 
This is natural enough, as the picture lives only through the man who is looking at it 
(Picasso, 1935/2002, p. 508). 
Psycho-aesthetic research often neglects these crucial dynamics of art perception by 
collecting and comparing static evaluations. In contrast, this thesis explored changes in 
perception and appreciation of semantical instability in art. The theoretical introduction 
provided a conceptual and historical background for various kinds of semantical 
instability in art with potentially different effects on perception and appreciation. The 
concepts of semantical instability and ambiguity were introduced as general terms 
naming objects which defy a determinate interpretation. These were specified in more 
detail by a further classification into hidden images which conceal identifiable patterns, 
multistable stimuli which offer several determinate interpretations and indeterminate or 
potential objects which promise but don’t provide a determinate interpretation. The 
reported publications used several of these kinds of semantical instability to approach 
the question how semantical instability in art can induce pleasure and appeal. 
They revealed that ambiguity in art is indeed positively linked to appreciation (Muth, 
Hesslinger, et al., 2015; see Core publication II). This effect contrasts—at least at first 
sight—predictions by the Hedonic Fluency Model (Winkielman et al., 2003) which links 
processing ease with high appreciation as well as approaches which link a moderate level 
of arousal (Berlyne, 1971) or ambiguity (Jakesch & Leder, 2009) with high appreciation 
(see an introduction of the according theories in chapter 1.3.3). One potential 
mechanism inducing the appeal of non-easy stimuli was introduced in Peripheral 
publication I: insights gained during the elaboration of hidden images led to an increase 
in appreciation (Muth & Carbon, 2013) suggesting that the creation of meaning is 
rewarding by itself. Accordingly, a crucial quality of many ambiguous artworks might be 
that they confront the perceiver with semantical instability on the one hand but also 
with opportunity for insight on the other hand. Indeed, not only hidden images but also 
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indeterminate Cubist artworks were appreciated more when they provided high 
detectability of objects (Muth et al., 2013a; see Core publication I). This is remarkable 
as—in contrast to hidden images—Cubist artworks never provide determinate 
identification (Gombrich, 1960/2002). It is interesting that the solvability of ambiguity 
in another set of visual artworks did not even have positive effects on liking, interest, and 
affect. Instead, the judged strength of insights gained during their elaboration predicted 
appreciation positively (Muth, Hesslinger, et al., 2015; see Core publication II). Here, the 
selected artworks evoked several kinds of ambiguity being hidden, indeterminate, or 
multistable images, sculptures, and objects. The Aesthetic Aha effect (Muth & Carbon, 
2013) might thus be applicable to semantical instability in art in general. By utilizing a 
slider as assessment device, Core publication III (Muth, et al., 2015) took a close look at the 
changes in perception and appreciation during the elaboration of artistic movies in which 
Gestalt emerges, vanishes, and transmutes to new Gestalt. This specific combination of a 
dynamic stimulus material with the Continuous Evaluation Procedure (CEP) enabled the 
proposal of a preliminary model of dynamics in the perception and appreciation of 
semantical instability (see Figure 8). It states that a certain level of complexity in 
semantically instable artworks can induce an increase in interest along with an orienting 
reaction in the perceiver. If further elaboration results in an insight this has rewarding 
effects which increases the appeal of the artwork in terms of liking. 
  
 
Figure 8. A preliminary model of dynamics in semantical instability  
and appreciation; adapted from Muth et al. (2015). 
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With regard to the main question of this thesis the comprised findings altogether 
implicate that semantical instability in art can indeed be appreciated and the experience 
of such artworks is marked by dynamics in perception and appreciation: it equals an 
insight-driven elaboration instead of a static evaluation or a linear progressive resolution 
of semantical instability. Positive affect can be gained not only by arriving at an insight 
but as well by anticipating it. This means that—also if artworks never provide a 
determinate meaning—they can arouse interest due to the induction of anticipations, 
association, or cues as well as they can induce reward and liking by (partial or 
peripheral) insights—even if they do not resolve ambiguity. 
This last point seems especially crucial to our understanding of the perception 
and appreciation of art in particular: how can insights contribute to a heightened 
pleasure by and appeal of artworks which leave us with unresolved mystery? A recent 
examination of the Aesthetic Aha effect (Muth & Carbon, 2013) and of the link between 
object-detectability and liking of Cubist artworks (Muth et al., 2013a) by Consoli (2015) 
might bring more light to this question. He proposed two phases of aesthetic pleasure 
during the perception of unsolvable semantical instability: perceptual insights would 
evoke an early aesthetic pleasure which motivates further exploration by signaling “that 
there is more, that other processes of integration are available” inducing “a complex 
network of cues, associations, and meanings” (para. 7). Such further integrations during 
elaboration have the potential to induce a late aesthetic pleasure. This idea underlines 
that insights are not only rewarding per se but also influence the perceiver’s predictions 
as well as the further course of elaboration. As mentioned above especially interest 
benefits from such anticipation of further insights. Also, an anticipatory quality of early 
aesthetic pleasure might explain the evidence of positive affect by incomplete or 
fragmentary interpretation of indeterminate artworks (see, e.g., Core publication I; 
Muth et al., 2013a):  
Even if the process of interpretation is still open and he [the viewer] has to face other 
challenges, we might expect that he begins to have a positive mood, determined by the 
previous series of insights and rewards. Enhancing this diffuse and enduring positive 
affect, great artworks can support and stimulate viewers' further explorations even when 
the degree of discrepancy is significantly high or discrepancy remains temporarily 
unsolved (Consoli, 2015, para. 9). 
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It might even be the case that we aspire towards a challenge of perceptual habits to 
arrive at an increased late aesthetic pleasure with elaboration. Similarly, Van de Cruys 
and Wagemans (2011) suggested: “The immediate motivation of seeking prediction 
errors may, in our view, be obtaining a larger reward (by contrast) later” (p. 1057). At 
the same time it is reasonable to assume that to induce deep elaboration—potentially 
leading to such an increased late aesthetic pleasure—early aesthetic pleasure might be 
needed. As described in chapter 1.3.3 the initial level of challenge or discrepancy from 
expectations should therefore be neither too high nor too low. Such optimal levels were 
for instance discussed with regard to ambiguity (moderate level, e.g., Jakesch & Leder, 
2009), novelty/typicality (combination, e.g., Hekkert, 2006), or arousal (moderate level, 
Berlyne, 1971). An alternative idea would draw on the proposed model in Figure 8 as well 
as on Consoli’s (2015) suggestion by stating that the likelihood of deep elaboration (and 
late aesthetic pleasure) is influenced by the degree to which an artwork allows for (early 
and anticipated) insights on various levels of understanding. Instead of a stable intensity 
of challenge assigned to the artwork, this idea includes dynamics by highlighting the 
relevance of the promise of rewarding experiences. It can be furthermore speculated that 
it might need both early (peripheral or partial) insights as well as an ongoing challenge 
to enable a late aesthetic pleasure. Also with regard to the pleasure of narratives a 
dynamic perspective on challenging as well as insightful moments is fruitful. Douglas 
and Hargadon (2000) for instance suggested:  
Just as immersion is satisfying as long as local details infuse the schema with unique or 
unpredictable elements, so engagement remains pleasurable only when it displaces or 
subverts one schema while offering readers suitable alternatives (Douglas & Hargadon, 
2000, p. 155). 
In an even wider context, the idea of insight-driven elaboration might qualify 
processes like exploration and learning in general: being confronted with a challenge 
together with a promise of rewarding insights might induce increased arousal along with 
an orienting reaction and increased interest. These effects might be crucial for the 
induction of curiosity—the motivation to gain new knowledge. Fost (1999) accordingly 
claimed that theorizing itself might be rewarding due to limbic reinforcement of neural 
binding processes. Similarly, Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) mentioned the 
possibility that 
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a limbic ‘reinforcement’ signal is not only fed back to early vision once an object has been 
completely identified, but is evoked at each and every stage in processing as soon as a 
partial ‘consistency’ and binding is achieved (...), at every stage in processing there is 
generated a ‘Look here, there is a clue to something potentially object-like’ signal that 
produces limbic activation and draws your attention to that region (or feature), thereby 
facilitating the processing of those regions or features at earlier stages (Ramachandran & 
Hirstein, 1999, pp. 22-23). 
While Ramachandran and Hirstein (1999) refer to reward by “partial consistency”—
which might apply for instance to indeterminate stages of elaboration—Biederman and 
Vessel (2006) refer to reward by multiple associations which might “lead to more neural 
activity in the association areas and hence to a greater release of endomorphins and 
increased stimulation of mu-opioid receptors” (p. 251) being associated with pleasure. 
The according mechanism is understood as a gain of pleasure by a gain of information—
similarly to Fost’s (1999) idea of rewarded theorizing. With reference to the findings 
reported within this thesis one could complement these ideas of reward by sense 
making by the point that the motivation for exploration and engagement might neither 
require processing fluency nor a constant progression towards a determinate solution—
although both factors might be effective on pleasure and appreciation as well.  
As mentioned in the introduction, a crucial critique on the simple concept of 
“aesthetic experience as art experience” is that not each encounter with an artwork leads 
to aesthetic experiences in terms of sensual delight, “aesthetic awe”, “being moved”, or 
by experiencing “thrills” (for an according differentiation of aesthetic affect see Konečni, 
2005, p. 27). Still, we were able to determine with some level of detail which facets of 
appreciation were affected by moments of insight when elaborating an artwork. 
Nevertheless, intense work is required to get to the core of what differentiates these 
supposedly aesthetic experiences from solving a riddle or from general successes in 
learning and exploration. It is plausible that the reported research projects crystallized a 
crucial factor influencing aesthetic experience of semantical instability in art; but as 
described above this factor might be relevant in the context of everyday perception, 
cognition, and affect as well. It is a tough debate in art theory if aesthetic experiences are 
fundamentally different from everyday experiences with regard to exclusive perceptual 
processes and mechanisms. Accordingly, Graham (1997/2000) asks if the kinds of 
pleasure induced by artworks equal “amusements”, “entertainments”, or—in contrast—
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“distinctively aesthetic pleasures” (p. 22). Also it is unclear how the concept of insight as 
promoted within this thesis is related to various concepts and ideas in the art theoretical 
tradition: how does an aesthetic insight differ from a conceptual insight? The latter is 
actually rather mentioned as a contrast to the quality of aesthetic pleasure and delight. 
In Kant’s (1790/1911) conception for instance beauty is marked by disinterest in 
determination “for, with it, no interest, whether of sense or reason, extorts approval” (p. 
49). And also Fiedler (1913/1971) opposes the shallowness of conceptual approaches and 
identification to the rich experiences we can gain by artistic approaches. 
Phenomenological investigations might clarify—at least to a certain extend—how the 
various different experiences of insights during the perception of ambiguous artworks 
(as only briefly discussed in Core publication III; Muth et al., 2015) are related to or 
differ from such processes of identification. It should be noted in this context that the 
focus on rewarding effects of perceptual and cognitive insight disregards approaches to 
aesthetics addressing mainly the emotional impact of art (for an overview on according 
theories see Graham, 1997/2000).  
Future research projects should also address the point that experiences are not 
only qualified by the experienced object or scene but as well by context and personality. 
An integration of object-, person-, and context-related facets of the experience of 
semantical instability in art is therefore crucial to an understanding of the relevant 
effects, mechanisms, and processes. As it was discussed in chapter 1.3.2 the 
phenomenon of semantical instability in art is a cultivated, historical feature and also its 
perception and appreciation is strongly influenced by conventions and historical changes 
(e.g., Krieger, 2010). We can ask accordingly in which situations and locations 
challenging artworks appeal and why they appeal in a different way to different persons 
as well as to one individual at different moments in time. Factors which might be 
especially relevant to the experience of semantical instability are for instance 
personality factors like intolerance of ambiguity (e.g., Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Reis, 
1996) which proved to influence the appreciation of ambiguity in art (see Core 
publication II; Muth, Hesslinger, et al., 2015). Another person-related variable, the 
feeling of (non-)safety, influenced the appreciation of innovativeness in a study by 
Carbon et al. (2013; safety was manipulated here via dimensions on which the material 
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had to be elaborated). Other factors which are closely linked to the perceiver are 
experience, expertise, and mood. The perceiver’s previous experiences are fundamental 
determinants with regard to the detection of ambiguities on the one hand and the gain of 
insights on the other hand. They also form the basis of expectations which—as described 
in detail above—are a crucial part of the aesthetic experience: it is the previous 
experience which determines if a prediction error is encountered in the first place and if 
hypothesis testing leads to alternative interpretations. The state of the perceiver as well 
as his or her expectations are of course also greatly influenced by context: Wolz and 
Carbon (2014) for instance manipulated semantic context by labelling artworks as 
“originals” or as “copies” and reported higher appreciation of the former. And also the 
Aesthetic Aha effect might as well be termed an effect of episodic context: the detection 
of a Gestalt is rewarding in the context of ambiguous stimulation (Muth & Carbon, 
2013). There is also evidence for the influence of physical context on appreciation: 
stimuli being evaluated in a museum context were appreciated more than in the 
laboratory and ambiguous stimuli were examined longer in the museum but shorter in 
the laboratory (Brieber, Nadal, Leder, & Rosenberg, 2014). We recently found a similar 
effect of physical context on appreciation with regard to the movies which have been 
introduced in the first section of this thesis and utilized in Core publication III: in the 
gallery setting, the movies were consistently liked more than in the laboratory. 
Furthermore, determinacy was rated to be higher in the gallery setting. It is unclear to 
this point if this effect is determined by the context only or if differences in person-
related factors play a role (Raab, Muth, & Carbon, 2014). The physical contexts in the 
two examples by Brieber et al. (2014) and Raab et al. (2014) are socio-cultural contexts 
as well: when persons with the same socialization as the according participants enter a 
gallery or a museum they might qualify the location as one in which their expectations 
will be challenged. Additionally, they might judge high ambiguity as a quality 
characteristic of great art (see Krieger, 2010) and perceive the situation as a rather 
playful, “safe” context. Such characteristics of a situation or context might influence the 
selection of an arousal-avoiding or an arousal-seeking mode. The so called reversal 
theory (Apter, 1989) suggests that we actually switch between these systems repeatedly; 
we can enjoy dangerous sports as well as a siesta despite their differences in arousal 
potential. Accordingly, we can state that the appeal of semantical instability might 
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depend on the mode of the perceiver and this mode is changeable by different contexts, 
personality, and expertise. Concerning the latter factor, Cupchik (1994) claimed that 
non-expert viewers would focus on immediate pleasure and moderate arousal while 
experienced viewers seek for challenging artworks. Figure 9D visualizes one strongly 
simplified example of how differences in context (e.g., museum versus lab) or person 
(e.g., high versus low ambiguity tolerance or expertise) might lead to variations in the 
strength of semantical instability and appreciation. 
 
Figures 9. Models of a static (A) and three dynamic accounts of semantical 
instability and appreciation (B-D). In model B the pattern of changes represents a 
mechanism by which appreciation is negatively linked to semantical instability. Model C 
considers the positive effect of one or several Aesthetic Ahas (!) and Model D 
additionally integrates effects of context and person alluded by variations of strength of 
the dimensions (light colored areas). 
 
One final aspect under which the presented findings shall be discussed is that 
they adopted one specific perspective on the phenomenon of semantical instability and 
its effect: a psychological—reception aesthetic—one. But semantical instability can be 
described in at least three different aspects which are not mutually exclusive: we can 
locate ambiguity in the artwork itself as it describes a structural feature of an object; for 
instance multistability (resembling a work aesthetic perspective). As discussed in 
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chapter 1.3.1 this endeavor is a challenge, partially due to the dynamics of according 
phenomena. We can thus locate ambiguity in the reception of art which can be instable 
not only due to structural features of the object but also due to knowledge and 
expectation of the observer or the context of the encounter as described above 
(resembling a reception aesthetic perspective). The concept of multistability can thus 
refer to perception itself as well. Also we can locate ambiguity in the production of art as 
for instance intentional openness of the artist during the creation of the artwork might 
not only lead to but also equal a semantical instability (resembling a production 
aesthetic perspective). Finally, we might even dare to locate it in the social context in 
which even a Ready Made is inspected with regard to meaningful content. The perceiver 
might activate a learned “script” which includes semantical instability by social 
convention. Especially the differentiation between object-centered versus reception-
centered approaches in psycho-aesthetics is tough but should be included in next steps 
to an empirical classification of ambiguity (as started by Muth & Carbon, 2012). Also 
questions regarding semantical instability from a production aesthetic perspective 
would be highly interesting in future studies: do artists explicitly or implicitly take into 
account which perceptual habits they defy and how perceivers might form insights on 
the basis of their work? 
Conclusions and outlook 
The findings reported within this thesis reveal that semantical instability in art can be 
appreciated and the experience of such artworks equals an insight-driven elaboration 
(see Figure 9C) instead of a static evaluation (see Figure 9A) or a linear progressive 
resolution of semantical instability (see Figure 9B). From this perspective, art 
perception is not a kind of problem solving process in which semantical instability 
needs to be resolved for the artwork to appeal. Appreciation might instead benefit from 
rewarding insights into the instable.  
These findings as well as the provided theoretical overview make evident that a 
further conceptual clarification is necessary with regard to semantical instability as well 
as with regard to insight. Also, future research should be invested in the assessment of 
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dynamics between semantical instability and aesthetic appreciation. Hereby, a focus on 
the role of expectation proved promising—especially with regard to variables like 
surprise, incongruity, and complexity on one hand and interest on the other hand. Also 
more complex affective responses like “aesthetic awe, being moved or touched, and 
thrills” (Konečni, 2005, p. 27) should be taken into account by future research projects 
to refine our understanding of the induced aesthetic experience. Furthermore, the 
reported effects have to be regarded from a multifold perspective on object-, person- and 
context-related factors (Figure 9D).  
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Supplementary material 
The movie “Konstrukte” (2009) can be watched here: http://vimeo.com/46138003. 
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